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State Consumer Protection Acts (CPAs) were adopted in the 1960s and 1970s to protect consumers from 
unfair and deceptive practices that would not be redressed but for the existence of the acts.  In this sense, 
CPAs were designed to fill existing gaps in market, legal and regulatory protections of consumers.  CPAs 
were designed to solve two simple economic problems: 1) individual consumers often do not have the 
incentive or means to pursue individual claims against mass marketers who engage in unfair and 
deceptive practices; and, 2) because of the difficulty of establishing elements of either common law fraud 
or breach of promise, those actions alone are too weak an instrument to deter seller fraud and deception.  
The most striking lesson of our analysis is that the typical state CPA – with relaxed rules for establishing 
liability, statutory damages, damage multipliers, attorneys fees and costs, and class actions – solves the 
basic economic problem that CPAs were intended to address several times over.  The effect of this 
redundancy in solutions is that CPAs can deter the provision of valuable information to consumers and, 
thus, harm consumers.  That is, as currently applied state Consumer Protection Acts harm consumers.  






                                                
CONSUMER HARM ACTS?   
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER 
STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS 
 
Henry N. Butler* and Jason S. Johnston** 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
State consumer protection acts (CPAs) were adopted in the 1960s 
and 1970s to protect consumers from unfair and deceptive practices that 
would not be redressed but for the existence of the acts.1  In this sense, 
CPAs were designed to fill existing gaps in market, common law, and 
regulatory protections of consumers.2  Of particular concern was the lack 
of incentive for individual consumers to pursue small claims that were 
uneconomical because of the costs of litigation under the common law.  
To create an incentive for private enforcement as a tool of consumer 
protection, state CPAs deliberately opened the courthouse doors: as a 
general rule, state CPAs provide for attorneys fees, authorize or at least 
allow class actions, grant expansive remedies (often including statutory 
minimum damages, treble damages, and punitive damages), adopt a very 
broad and open-ended substantive prohibition of “false, unfair and 
deceptive” selling practices, and – in some states – even dispense with 
the requirement that a plaintiff plead and prove that she was injured by 
 
* Executive Director, Searle Center on Law, Regulation, and Economic Growth, 
and Senior Lecturer, Northwestern University School of Law. 
** Robert G. Fuller Jr. Professor of Law and Director, Program on Law, the 
Environment, and the Economy, University of Pennsylvania School of Law. 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Case Western Reserve University, 
Harvard, and the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics 
Association at Columbia.  The authors thank participants at those seminars, as well as 
Steven Shavell, Joshua Wright, and Samatha Zyontz,  for helpful comments.  The 
authors also thank Elise Nelson, Fern Richardson English, Adam Luetto, and Jonathan 
Hillel for valuable research assistance. 
1 See Michael M. Greenfield, Consumer Law: A Guide for Those Who Represent 
Sellers, Lenders, and Consumers 64 (1995). 
2 But see Michael S. Greve, Consumer Law, Class Actions, and the Common Law, 
7 Chapman L. Rev. 155, 156 (“While unknown before the 1970s, modern ‘consumer 
law’ does not govern a single transaction that is not also covered by traditional common 
law doctrines.  However, where tort law required an actual injury as an essential 
element of a cause of action; consumer law dispenses with that requirement and others 
like it, such as inducement and detrimental reliance.  Where the common law matched 
the seller’s duty to steer clear of fraud and misrepresentation with the contractual 




                                                
such practices. 
Given the promise of expansive awards made under a relaxed 
liability standard offered by state CPAs, it is hardly shocking that private 
actions under state CPAs have become one of the great growth areas of 
American litigation.  Over the period 2000-2007, all reported decisions 
involving a state CPA claim in state appellate courts increased by over 
43%, while those decided in federal courts almost tripled.3 According to 
leaders of the tort reform movement, this massive upsurge in state CPA 
litigation does not reflect some new wave of false and deceptive 
consumer marketing practices, but rather a tide of at best highly doubtful 
claims brought by private class action attorneys seeking a big payday, a 
tide of litigation that is symptomatic of the broader litigation crisis.4  
One such case has indeed achieved worldwide notoriety: the $54 million 
action under the District of Columbia CPA brought in 2006 by a (then) 
administrative law judge against a dry cleaner for losing a pair of pants.5 
To some commentators, the upsurge in CPA litigation is not only 
of little concern, but is actually a sign that state CPA laws are succeeding 
in their stated goal of protecting consumers. One leading consumer 
advocate, for example, has described CPAs as “popular,”6 and even 
suggested that the reasoning and interpretation of state CPAs should be 
applied more broadly to expand the common law’s understanding of 
fraud.7  On the other extreme, a leading law and economics scholar has 
questioned the need for any form of CPA liability, arguing that 
consumers do not need the kind of specific information about products 
that consumer advocates demand that sellers to disclose, and that market 
forces such as a seller’s desire to acquire and maintain a reputation for 
honesty and quality sufficiently discipline and drive out false and 
 
3 Searle Civil Justice Institute, State Consumer Protection Act Pilot Study 17 (draft 
of March 10, 2009).  As this study notes, id at n. 47, the increase in federal court state 
CPA actions accelerated in 2005, when the Class Action Fairness Act pushed many 
class actions into federal court. 
4 See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, Private Consumer Protection 
Lawsuit Abuse: When Claims are Driven by Profit-driven Lawyers And Interest-Group 
Agendas, Not The Benefit of Consumers (2006). 
5 D.C. Code § 28-3901 et seq.  The case, Docket No. 05-CA-4302B, was 
dismissed.  Chris Conway, Determining Who’s Gotten Satisfaction, N.Y. Times 42 
(July 1, 2007) (available at 2007 WLNR 12516195). 
6 Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market Customers:  
Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law of Fraud, 
48 Ariz. L. Rev. 829, 832. 
7 Braucher, supra note 3, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. at 830. 
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deceptive selling practices.8   
In this Article, we develop and support an intermediate position, 
taken by some leading tort reform advocates, that state CPAs can serve a 
very useful and indeed economically justified role in supplementing the 
protection offered to consumers by the market, the common law, and 
federal consumer protection regulation, but only if those statutes are 
reformed and sensibly interpreted by the courts. 9  We apply the tools of 
economic analysis to identify where state CPA law, as currently 
interpreted by the courts, has probably gone wrong from the point of 
view of optimally deterring socially undesirable deceptive selling 
practices, and we recommend changes in both statutory structure and 
judicial interpretation that will make state CPAs an instrument of market 
efficiency, rather than a source of inefficient and socially harmful 
litigation.  
Part II provides an overview of state CPAs in which we identify 
the two economically crucial features of the current CPA landscape: 
statutory provisions that have created a process that offers enormous 
potential rewards even to very dubious lawsuits that are brought often 
simply to secure a settlement; and a vague substantive standard of 
liability that has been  interpreted so expansively by the courts that even 
the most seemingly straightforward and informative marketing practices 
and communications can trigger potential CPA liability.  Part II also 
develops an economic framework in which we analyze the impact of 
these two crucial features of state CPA law on seller behavior.  As we 
argue, state CPA law as currently configured is likely to significantly 
over-deter the targeted practices.  The CPA liability regime likely often 
attaches liability even to socially desirable selling practices, and thereby 
creates an incentive for sellers to withhold socially valuable information 
from consumers.  But as sellers may incur liability under state CPAs 
 
8 See Student Blogger, The Myths of Consumer Protection Law, February 26, 
2009, available at http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/02/the-myths-of-
consumer-protection-law.html (summarizing annual Ronald H. Coase lecture delivered 
by Professor Omri Ben-Shahar of the University of Chicago Law School).  
9 See Victor E. Schwartz and Cary Silverman, Common Sense Construction of 
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (2005) (hereinafter Schwartz & 
Silverman). The current controversy has arisen in the absence of significant changes in 
most state CPAs.  Indeed, most CPAs were not controversial during the first twenty 
years.  However, the potential for problematic applications of CPAs was recognized 
earlier.  See, e.g., Marshall A. Leaffer and Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions 
Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade 
Commission Jurisprudence, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 521, 534 (1979-1980). 
 
  5
                                                
both by saying too much and saying too little, the most certain economic 
impact of overly expansive state CPA liability may be to effectively 
impose an excise tax on every sale of a consumer good or service, thus 
increasing prices and lessening consumer welfare, all with no benefit in 
terms of deterring socially undesirable seller behavior.  
In Part III, we situate state CPA liability within the broader 
landscape of institutions for consumer protection.  These institutions 
include the market, the common law, and federal consumer protection 
regulation by the Federal Trade Commission.  We analyze how the 
market, as supplemented by the common law of fraud and warranties, 
does indeed provide significant checks against deceptive consumer 
selling practices and advertising.10  However, we note two serious 
shortcomings – from the point of view of optimal deterrence –in the 
market/common law regime: imperfect determination of liability, and 
costs of liability determination that are disproportionate to the loss 
suffered by an individual consumer.  These shortcomings of the 
market/common law regime provide an economic justification for 
regulation (either federal or state) that balances the benefits and costs of 
such intervention.  However, as we explain, as currently implemented, 
state CPA liability is likely to actually weaken the incentives against 
consumer deception provided by the market and common law. 
The Federal Trade Commission now enforces the FTC Act’s 
prohibition of “false, unfair and deceptive” practices under guidelines for 
deceptive and unfair practices which seek to balance the costs and 
benefits of regulation.11  The FTC’s consumer protection mission is 
guided by a consumer welfare standard.12  However, enforcement of 
state CPAs through private litigation rarely reflects the economic 
 
10 On market forces for consumer protection, see generally Gillian K. Hadfield, 
Robert Howse, and Michael J. Trebilcock, Information-based Principles for Rethinking 
Consumer Protection Policy, 21 Journal of Consumer Policy 131 (1998). 
11 See, e.g., Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Future 
Development of U.S. Consumer Protection Policy, George Mason University School of 
Law, Law and Economics Working Paper Series, available at Social Science Research 
Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=545182; and J. 
Howard Beales III, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority, Its Rise, Fall, and 
Resurrection (May 30, 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/unfair0603.shtm. 
12 Despite early jurisprudential and academic uncertainty as to the intended purpose 
of the federal antitrust laws, the Supreme Court has adopted the majority position that 
consumer welfare is the central policy underlying the Sherman, Clayton and FTC Acts.  
See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979);  Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust 
Paradox 51 (2d ed. 1993), and Charles J. Goetz & Fred S. McChesney, Antirust Law: 
Interpretation and Implementation 51-52 (3rd ed. 2006).   
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sophistication of the FTC in implementing the consumer welfare 
standard.  For this reason, we conclude that whatever may be the 
shortcomings of consumer protection regulatory enforcement by the 
FTC, state CPAs as currently structured and interpreted have encouraged 
private actions that go far beyond what is necessary to optimally 
supplement the FTC enforcement regime. 
Part IV sets out the implications of our analysis for the reform of 
state CPAs and their interpretation by the courts.  First, courts and 
legislatures should recognize that many provisions of CPAs are 
redundant.  Many CPA provisions are designed to make it easier and 
more economical for individual consumers to recover for losses, yet 
many of these provisions are not necessary to give plaintiffs adequate 
incentives with consumer class actions.  Thus, courts and legislatures 
should recognize the fundamental differences between the two types of 
actions.  Second, just as a common law plaintiff must show reliance, 
causation and harm, so too should consumer protection class action 
plaintiffs be required to plead and prove these basic elements. Third, 
private class actions should be required, as a threshold matter, to satisfy a 
consumer welfare standard akin to that under which the FTC operates in 
enforcing the FTC Act. In applying a consumer welfare standard to 
CPAs, state courts could rely on FTC interpretations for guidance.  
Finally, consumer welfare would be enhanced if legislatures amended 
their CPAs to limit the scope of private actions to those that satisfy a 
consumer welfare standard.   
 
II.  NO HARM, NO FAULT, YET MASSIVE POTENTIAL 
LIABILITY: THE STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCE 
OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACTS  
 
CPAs have recently received harsh criticism by business groups 
and tort reform advocates.13  The core of this critique is that the broad 
language of state CPA statutes and liberal judicial interpretations have 
led to massive amounts of litigation, disproportionately large damage 
awards and settlements for unharmed plaintiffs, and overcompensation 
for plaintiff’s attorneys.  Later in the paper, we provide an economic 
foundation for this critique.  But to do so, we must first set out the salient 
 
13 See, e.g., American Tort Reform Association, Private Consumer Protection 
Lawsuit Abuse: When Claims are Driven by Profit-driven Lawyers And Interest-Group 
Agendas, Not The Benefit of Consumers (2006). 
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structural features of state CPAs.  The first set of features are statutory 
provisions that have the general effect of opening the courthouse doors 
to private CPA lawsuits. These might be called procedural.  The second 
vital aspect of CPA litigation is substantive, and has to do with the way 
that courts have interpreted the generally vague statutory CPA 
prohibition of “false and deceptive” practices so as to allow even the 
most seemingly straightforwardly informative marketing 
communications to trigger potential CPA liability. 
 
A.  Historical Background and Purpose of State Consumer 
Protection Acts 
 
Every state in the nation has some kind of state consumer 
protection statute, and many have more than one statutory framework for 
consumer protection.  About thirty states have in place legislation that 
tracks the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act or Uniform Consumer 
Sales Practice Acts.14 These laws typically have rather long and detailed 
lists of prohibited practices (such as advertising goods with the intent not 
to sell them as advertised).15  Nine states have “consumer fraud” statutes 
that make unlawful broad categories of acts including “fraud,” 
“deception” and “false promise” in the “sale or advertisement” of goods 
when done with an “intent that others rely” upon the act.16 Finally, 
encouraged by the Federal Trade Commission, and in tune with the 
explosive growth of federal regulation during the 1970s, “Little FTC 
Acts”17 – which typically contain identical language to the FTC Act 
forbidding “unfair competition and deceptive acts and practices” – were 
adopted in every state by 1981.18  These statutes are typically very short, 
broadly prohibiting conduct that is “false or deceptive” and granting 
private parties very broad standing to sue.19  Importantly, these statutes 
often overlap.  California, for example, has both an Unfair Competition 
 
14 Alan S. Brown and Larry E. Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes 
Across the Fifty States, 55 FDCC Quarterly 263, 266 (2005). 
15 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 266-
267. 
16 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 268. 
17 Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 437, 446 (1991). 
18 Id. 
19 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 269. 
California Business and Professions Code Section 17200, for example, prohibits “any 
unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or 
misleading advertising.” 
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Law20 modeled after the FTC Act and an Unfair Practices Act21 that 
tracks the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 
There is a long list of public interest reasons22 for the adoption of 
CPAs,23 including: 
1. The costs for individual consumers to litigate these matters in 
state courts were often prohibitive;  
2. Difficulty for consumers to prevail in state common law actions 
for fraud, misrepresentation and warranty, as discussed above; 
3. Disparity in bargaining power between consumer and businesses; 
4. Neither the federal government nor the states could enforce all 
actions, so private attorneys general – empowered by the ability 
to recover costs, attorney fees and multiple damages – were 
necessary to supplement the public enforcement actions; and 
5. Private enforcement actions may be necessary to carry out the 
legislative intent when pro-business (or anti-consumer) interest 
groups control the executive branch.24 
 
In spite of the role of the FTC in encouraging the adoption of 
CPAs, there are major differences between the FTC Act and state CPAs.  
These differences indeed define the economically crucial features of 
state CPAs.  
 
B.  Opening the Courthouse to Private Suits:  Procedural Provisions 
of State CPA Laws  
 
As a general matter, relative to both the common law and other 
default rules of procedure, state CPA statutes effect a remarkable 
expansion in the private ability to sue.   
 
20 Cal. Civ. Code §17200 et. seq. 
21 Cal. Civ. Code §1770 et. seq. 
22  The enactment of CPAs is often described in terms of a logical gap filling made 
necessary by the inability of the common law to deal with problems of a mass marketed 
national economy.  Such public interest rhetoric should be met with skepticism.  
Perhaps the intent of CPAs should be inferred from their effect.  Attorneys who file 
actions on behalf of consumers are vocal opponents of reform efforts.  However, the 
fact that they expect to be losers if CPAs are reformed does not demonstrate that they 
were the intended winners when the acts were passed.  Regardless, even if the CPAs 
had a more benign intent, it is clear that they have created interest groups in their wake.   
23 See, e.g., Mark D. Bauer, The Licensed Professional Exemption in Consumer 
Protection: At Odds with Antitrust History and Precedent, 73 Tenn. L. Rev. 131 (2006). 
24  This argument is similar to the argument used for private actions under state and 
federal environment statutes. 
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1. Broad Private Standing to Sue with No Injury or Causation 
Requirement 
 
The majority of state CPA’s can be enforced both by the state 
Attorney General and by private plaintiffs.25  While in many states, a 
private CPA plaintiff must prove that she suffered injury as a result of 
the statutory violation – the false or deceptive practice – in others, the 
plaintiff may prevail simply by showing that the act or practice was 
likely to be misleading or had a tendency to deceive consumers.26 Many 
courts have interpreted the damage requirements of their state’s statute to 
be a very low standard that is easily met.27  Some states even allow an 
admittedly non-injured person to bring a suit on behalf of the general 
public or on behalf of other consumers. 
Several courts have adopted a broad definition of injury that is 
per se satisfied on the occurrence of a misrepresentation.  For example, 
in Aspinall v. Philip Morris, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated 
“We reject the proposition that the purchase of an intentionally falsely 
represented product cannot be, by itself, an ascertainable injury under 
our consumer protection statute.”28  Consistent with this broad 
interpretation, the Massachusetts court also dispensed with the traditional 
reliance requirement, stating “[a] successful action based on deceptive 
acts or practices does not require proof that the plaintiff relied on the 
representation.”29  
Although a seeming countervailing force to the “no injury” cases 
can be found in the expansion of the economic loss rule to state CPAs, 
there has not been strong advocacy of application of the doctrine.30  For 
example, Professor Braucher identifies the case of Werwinski v. Ford 
Motor Co. where the Third Circuit applied the economic loss rule to 
 
25 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 270, 
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 
supra note __ at __. Only Iowa relies exclusively on its attorney general to enforce the 
state’s consumer protection laws. See Molo Oil Co. v. River City Ford Truck Sales, 
Inc., 578 N.W.2d. 222, 227-28 (Iowa 1998). 
26 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 272, 
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 
supra note __ at __. 
27 Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 4, at 22.. 
28 Aspinall v. Philip Morris, 813 N.E.2d at 486 (MA 2005). 
29  Id. at 486. 
30 Ellen M. Bublic, Economic Torts: Gains In Understanding Losses, 48 Ariz. L. 
Rev. 693, 700 (2006) 
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Pennsylvania’s CPA, yet subsequent Pennsylvania state and district 
courts refuse to follow the holding.31  The disparate outcomes in 
Pennsylvania are indicative of the courts’ ability to expand the economic 
loss doctrine or not in this unsettled part of the law.        
Hence under many state CPA statutes, a private party can bring 
suit in a purely private attorney general role, alleging only that certain 
practices were likely to harm the general consuming public, without any 
requirement of proving actual injury or causation. people who may have 
been harmed.32 This private enforcement is a substitute for 
administrative enforcement, and it is often suggested that private 
enforcement is relied upon because states do not adequately fund 
consumer protection agencies. 33  This assertion begs the question of why 
state legislatures do not provide adequate funding.  Regardless, private 
actions under CPAs often do not require a public interest impact as is 
required of the FTC under the FTC Act.34 
 
2. Potentially Expansive Remedies 
 
The remedy available to a successful CPA plaintiff varies greatly, 
not only across the states but also across different types of state CPA.  
Under California’s Unfair Competition Law, and the Uniform Deceptive 
Trade Practices Act of several other states, only equitable relief is 
available.35  Equitable relief, however, includes not only injunctions but 
also restitutionary, restorative money awards, and, at least in California, 
restitution is “not limited to the return of money or property that was 
once in the possession of the person,” but is “broad enough to allow a 
 
31 Braucher, supra note , at 848, citing  Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 
357 F.3d 392, 400, 401 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004). 
32 See, e.g., D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3905(k)(1) (2001); and Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-
113 (2004). 
33 See, Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 437, 448 (1991) (“State 
and local consumer agencies lack sufficient resources to pursue every consumer fraud 
vigorously, and so, like the FTC, face strong incentives to confine their activities to 
cases likely to have a broad impact.  To plug the holes in consumer fraud enforcement, 
nearly every state has now extended to injured consumers the power to sue merchants 
who engage in deceptive practices.”). 
34  Braucher, supra note 3, at n. 1.  See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2000) (requiring the 
Commission to find that bringing an action in federal court to enjoin a violation of the 
FTC Act is in the public interest). 
35 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 277, 
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 
supra note __ at __. 
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plaintiff to recover money or property in which he or she has a vested 
interest.”36   
In a few other states, a CPA plaintiff’s remedies are limited to the 
recovery of actual damages.37  Much more commonly, however, state 
CPAs give the option of choosing the greater of actual or statutory 
damages.  Generally, these statutory damages are in the range of $100 to 
$500, but in New Hampshire they are $1000 and in Kansas $5000, while 
for flagrant or repeated violations in Idaho, the plaintiff’s statutory 
damages are $1000 plus punitive damages.38  
In addition to statutory damages, state CPAs that allow plaintiffs 
to recover actual damages also typically authorize the recovery of treble 
damages.39 About two-thirds of state laws provide for treble damages to 
punish a defendant for wrongful conduct.40 Several states double or 
treble damages regardless of the egregiousness of the defendant’s 
conduct41 and in another nine states treble damages are available if the 
defendant acted intentionally, willfully, knowingly, or in bad faith.42 In 
New Jersey and Ohio, and under California’s Deceptive Practices Act, 
treble damages are actually mandatory.43  And in Colorado, the District 
of Columbia and Hawaii, the plaintiff can choose the greater of treble 
damages or statutory damages.44  
 
36 Juarez v. Arcadia Fin, Ltd., 61 Cal.Rptr.3d 382, 400 (2007). See also Lozano v. 
AT&T Wireless Services Inc., 504 F.3d 718, __ (9th Cir. 2007) 
37 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 278, 
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 
supra note __ at __. 
38 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 278-
279 Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection 
Acts, supra note __ at __. 
39 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 280-
281 Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection 
Acts, supra note __ at __. 
40 See generally, Schwartz, supra, note 2. 
41 See Alaska Stat. § 45.50.531(a) (2004); D.C. Code Ann. § 28-3905(k) (2001); 
Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 480-13 (2004); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-19 (2001); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 75-16 (2003); Wis. Stat. § 100.20(5) (2004). 
42 See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-113(2)(a)(III); Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-399(c) (2000); 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:10 (1995); N.M. Stat. 
Ann. § 57-12-10(B); N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h); S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-140(a) 
(1985); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a)(3) (2001); Va. Code Ann. § 59.1-204(A); Tex. 
Bus. & Com. Code Ann. § 17.50(b)(1) (2002). 
43 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 280, 
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 
supra note __ at __. 
44 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 281, 
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 
supra note __ at __. 
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Consistently with treble damage provisions, most states have 
CPAs that at least permit punitive damages.45   Many state CPAs require 
that in order to recover punitive damages, the plaintiff must show a 
heightened level of fault, such as a showing of malicious or aggravated 
fraud.46  Still other state CPAs cap punitive damages.47 
 
3. Class Actions and Attorney’s Fees 
 
While some state CPAs explicitly prohibit class actions, the laws 
of at least fourteen states and those of the District Columbia expressly 
permit class actions.48  State CPAs modeled after the FTC Act are silent 
on the availability of class actions, but courts have commonly found that 
class action relief is available under such statutes.49  
As for attorneys’ fees, state CPAs are a dramatic exception to the 
default “American” rule, under which each party bears their own 
attorney’s fees.  Nearly half the state CPAs require an award of 
reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing plaintiff, and there are indeed 
only a few states that follow the “American” rule in CPA cases.50  
 
C. The Economic Consequences of the State CPA Process 
 
Not every state CPA combines every procedural feature just 
described.  However, the three key features we have highlighted – 
relaxed standing for private lawsuits, potentially expansive remedies, and 
the availability of class actions and attorney’s fees – combine to greatly 
increase the payoff that a private attorney can expect from a CPA lawsuit 
 
 
45 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 279, 
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 
supra note __ at __. 
46 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 279, 
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 
supra note __ at __. 
47 Brown & Hepler, Comparison of Consumer Fraud Statutes, supra note __ at 279, 
Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 
supra note __ at __. 
48 Albeit sometimes with specific limitations on the form of relief that may be 
obtained.  See Schwartz and Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer 
Protection Acts, supra note __ at 29. 
49 Schwartz & Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection 
Acts, supra note __ at 29. 
50 Schwartz & Silverman, Common Sense Construction of Consumer Protection 
Acts, supra note __ at 26-27. 
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relative to some other sort of case.  The fundamental economics of 
private litigation predicts that the key state CPA procedural features we 
have highlighted above will have systematically distorted private 
incentives so that CPA lawsuits will be brought that have very little to do 
with deterring socially harmful deceptive consumer practices. 
Consider first the impact of eliminating or lessening the 
requirement that the plaintiff must show injury, reliance and causation – 
that she saw or heard the defendant’s communication, and relied upon it 
in deciding to buy the defendant’s product.  Observe that this means that 
the plaintiff need not stand in any particular relationship to the product or 
the alleged false or deceptive practice: all she needs to allege is that 
some consumers were likely to be misled by the false or deceptive 
practice, not that she even saw or heard it.51  This is a major change in 
the law, and a step that the FTC has been unwilling to take.52  At least 
under those state CPAs where class actions are permitted, eliminating the 
requirements of injury and reliance (causation), essentially makes 
actionable almost any seller communication if that communication is 
sent to a large enough number of consumers.   This is because state 
CPAs almost uniformly authorize attorney’s fees.  With the prospect of 
 
51 Unsurprisingly, as the plaintiff need not stand in any particular relationship to a 
state CPA defendant, many state courts have held that traditional common law defenses 
are not available, including: the statute of frauds, see, e.g., McClure v. Duggan, 674 F. 
Supp. 211, 224 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (statute of frauds not applicable under Texas 
deceptive trade practices act); warranty disclaimers, see, e.g., Attaway v. Tom's Auto 
Sales, Inc., 144 Ga. App. 813, 242 S.E.2d 740 (1978); the doctrine of substantial 
performance, see, e.g., Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. 1980) (“A 
primary purpose of the enactment of the DTPA was to provide consumers a cause of 
action for deceptive trade practices without the burden of proof and numerous defenses 
encountered in a common law fraud or breach of warranty suit.” at 616); the parol 
evidence rule, see, e.g., Teague Motor Co. v. Rowton, 84 Or. App. 72, 733 P.2d 93 
(1987) (parol evidence may be used in Oregon consumer protection cases), Weitzel v. 
Barnes, 691 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Tex. 1985) (parol evidence may be used in Texas 
consumer protection cases), Capp Homes v. Duarto, 617 F.2d 900, 902 n.1 (1st Cir. 
1980) (parol evidence may be used in Massachusetts consumer protection cases); the 
common law merger doctrine, see generally Note, DTPA Precludes Use of Merger 
Doctrine and Parol Evidence Rule in Breach of Warranty Suit: Alvarado v. Bolton, 41 
BAYLOR L. REV. 373 (1989); contractual limitations on liability or remedies, see, e.g., 
International Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distrib., 803 F.2d 150, 155-56 (5th Cir. 
1986) (contractual limitations inapplicable in suit under Texas “Little FTC Act”), 
Corral v. Rolling Protective Service. Co., 240 Kan. 678, 732 P.2d 1260 (1987) (same 
under Kansas law), and Reliance Universal, Inc. v. Sparks Indus., 688 S.W.2d 890 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (same under Texas law); and privity of contract requirements, see 
generally Note, The DTPA and Privity: Let the Buyer Beware Becomes Let the Buyer 
Recover, 39 BAYLOR L. REV. 787 (1987). 
52 As discussed above, the FTC requires reasonable reliance in its definitions of 
both unfair and deceptive practices. 
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recovering attorney’s fees for succeeding merely in showing that some 
consumers might well have been misled by a challenged practice, the 
typical incentive of a class attorney to select cases based at least in part 
on the amount of harm suffered by the individual plaintiffs is 
significantly weakened.  Instead, regardless of whether any consumer 
actually suffered harm due to a practice challenged as false or deceptive, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys will have an incentive to role the dice and bring class 
actions simply on the chance that they might succeed in showing that 
some consumers were misled by a particular practice and then be entitled 
to attorney’s fees.  
This problem is far from theoretical.  California’s Unfair 
Competition Law provides only equitable remedies and does not permit 
the recovery of damages.  However, that same law  authorizes attorneys 
fees and equitable relief, and prior to the passage of reform legislation in 
2004,53 did not require plaintiffs to show that they had suffered injury.  
By the time of the 2004 legislative reform, California’s Unfair 
Competition Law had acquired national notoriety as breeding litigation 
that the State Attorney General himself eventually called 
“extortionate.”54  In a mounting cascade of litigation, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys had sued defendants large and small, bringing class action suits 
based on allegedly deceptive practices that seemingly harmed no one:  
against software makers for putting software in boxes that were “too 
big,” allegedly tending to deceive consumers into thinking that there 
were more than just one or two disks;55 against auto shops for years-old 
technical regulatory violations – such as failure to give a customer a 
copy of an estimate –  that had not resulted in fines but which were still 
recorded on the Bureau of Automotive Repair’s website;56 against nail 
salons for allegedly deceptively using the same bottle of nail polish on 
multiple customers, a practice regarded by the State Board of Barbering 
 
53 Proposition 64, passed November 2, 2004, and codified as amendments to 
Cal.Civ.Code §17200. 
54 See Jonathan D. Glater, California Says State Law Was used as Extortion Tool, 
New York Times, April 5, 2003, People of the State of California v. Trevor Law Group, 
LLP (Complaint for Injunction, Restitution and Other Equitable Relief, filed __, 
available at __). 
55 Civil Justice Association of California, Examples of Unfair Competition 
Lawsuits Filed by Private Attorneys, available at 
www.cjac.org/newsandreserach/prop64/ 
56 John H. Sullivan, California’s Notorious “17200” – Written by Lewis Carroll, 
Adapted by Stephen King? (October 24, 2002), available at [CJAS]. See also Glater, 
California Says State Law Was used as Extortion Tool, supra note __. 
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and Cosmetology as standard in the industry;57 against grocery stores for 
putting tags with both the actual and suggested retail price on cosmetics, 
watches and wallets.58  According to the California Attorney General, 
many such lawsuits reflected a pattern in which plaintiffs’ firms would 
file complaints and simultaneously send letters demanding settlements 
from the targeted defendants.   
After years of criticism of such suits, in November, 2004, the 
citizens of California passed by referendum Proposition 64.  Proposition 
64 amended certain provisions of California’s Unfair Competition Law 
and its False Advertising Law by restricting private actions to persons 
who had suffered injury in fact.59  As subsequent judicial opinions have 
interpreted it, after Proposition 64, it is no longer possible for a plaintiff 
in an Unfair Competition Law claim in California to merely allege that 
some consumers would likely have been misled by the defendant’s 
marketing practices or advertisements.  Instead, a plaintiff must allege 
that she in fact relied upon the practice or advertisement and suffered 
concrete injury as a result of such reliance.  
By adding such a requirement to California CPA law, Proposition 
64 has had the clearly salutary effect of making the legal proof of harm 
at least relevant to potential liability under that state’s CPA regime.  
However, as we show in the Appendix, it remains the case that by 
allowing class actions with attorneys fees for successful plaintiffs and 
restitutionary recovery that may be very costly to defendants, 
California’s CPA still makes it potentially profitable for class action 
plaintiff attorneys to bring even lawsuits with a very low probability of 
eventual success.  In other words, even if Proposition 64 has made it 
harder for plaintiffs to succeed – because now they must prove that they 
have been injured by the allegedly false or deceptive practice – CPA 
 
57 CFIF, Shakedown in the ‘Golden State,’ available at 
www.cfif.org/htdocs/legislative_issues/federal_issues/. 
58 From Civil Justice Association of California, Examples of Unfair Competition 
Lawsuits Filed by Private Attorneys, available at 
www.cjac.org/newsandreserach/prop64/. 
59 After Proposition 64, Bus. & Prof. Code §17204 now provides that “[a]ctions for 
any relief pursuant to this chapter shall be prosecuted…by any person who has suffered 
injury in fact and has lost money or property as a result of such unfair competition.”  
The  corresponding provision of the False Advertising Law, Bus. & Prof. Code §17535, 
was amended to require that “[a]ctions for injunction under this section may be 
prosecuted by…any person who has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or 
property as a result of this chapter. Any person may pursue representative claims or 
relief on behalf of others only if the claimant meets the standing requirements of this 
section and complies with section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure.”  
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actions will be relatively attractive to plaintiffs’ attorneys.  As we also 
show, the incentive for suit would be even greater in a regime that 
granted compensatory relief and punitive or treble damages.   
From an economic point of view, the problem with state CPAs is 
that they were crafted to offset a problem that has largely been dealt with 
by other means.  As put by a leading consumer law scholar of the little 
FTC era, the problem addressed by state CPAs was that: 
 
“Theoretically, of course, most consumers could eventually 
address their rights by bringing a lawsuit.  But from a practical 
standpoint the costs of investigation and litigation bulk very large in 
comparison with the damages which might be obtained.  Hence, 
personal injury litigation is rarely an effective remedy for consumer 
injustice  under the present rules of the game in most states. “60 
 
As we discuss in more detail below, this problem – inadequate 
private incentives for suit – is a real one, and it can indeed lead to 
underdeterrence of marketing practices that are truly fraudulent and 
deceptive (in that they fool consumers into buying things that they would 
not buy if they knew their true quality and characteristics).  Ironically, 
however, during almost precisely the same time period when states were 
passing their little FTC Acts – 1967 to 197261 -- states were also 
following the standard set by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 by 
promulgating rules authorizing class actions in state court.62 The class 
action procedural device allows the aggregation of precisely the kind of 
small consumer claims that would otherwise not be economically viable.  
Provided that successful plaintiffs’ attorneys can receive either court 
awarded attorneys fees or a share of the total award recovered on behalf 
of the class as a whole, by aggregating the small damages suffered by 
many plaintiffs into a single recovery fund, the class action itself 
provides very strong incentives for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring 
 
60 William A. Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 Admin. L. 
Rev. 271, 273 (1970). 
61 William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 Tulane L. 
Rev. 724, 730 (1971). 
62 As shown by Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in 
Historical Perspective: A Preliminary View, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1439, 1500-1501, 
1544-1551 (2008) the majority of states adopted a version of Rule 23 between 1966 and 
1979.  California took the view that class actions had been authorized by its 1872 Field 
Code, but follows Rule 23 and Rule 23 caselaw.  Only Mississippi and Virginia do not 
allow class actions. 
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consumer protection suits.  That is, to make consumer protection suits 
viable and ensure adequate deterrence, there is no need for the statutory 
or enhanced – trebled or more general punitive – damages that are found 
in a large number of state CPAs.  
Under CPAs as currently structured, plaintiffs’ attorneys stand to 
reap large expected payouts by pursuing even those CPA suits that have 
a very low probability of success.  Given the oftentimes very broad 
interpretation of “harm” under state CPAs, even a formal requirement 
that the plaintiff plead and prove that she was harmed by the defendant’s 
conduct does not guarantee that plaintiff actually was made worse off by 
virtue of the defendant’s allegedly false or deceptive practice. And, of 
course, a plaintiffs’ attorney has no obligation whatsoever to ensure that 
the CPA cases she pursues are in the public interest in any sense.  
Indeed, studies of private class actions have made it unmistakably clear 
that class actions achieve deterrence that would otherwise be lost, but at 
a cost – potentially collusive settlements between class attorneys and 
defendants that transfer large sums to class attorneys (but relatively little 
to actual class members) while letting defendants get off the hook with 
total liability that is small relative to the harm they have caused.63  
It is not surprising that class actions under California’s CPA have 
come to be perceived as intended merely to induce settlement, rather 
than deter truly harmful practices. As Professor George Priest explains:  
 
[A] principal concern regarding the operation of class 
actions is that the certification of a class itself, often based 
upon satisfaction of relatively undemanding procedural 
requirements, will bludgeon a defendant into a massive 
settlement.  . . . Commentators unanimously concede that 
virtually every mass tort class action that have been 
successfully certified has settled out of court rather than been 
litigated to judgment.  . . .  We have recently observed 
 
63 See Deborah R. Hensler, e al, Class Action Dilemmas: Pursuing Public Goals for 
Private Gain 79-99 (2000) (discussing evidence for, and varieties of such collusive 
settlements). Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey Miller, Attorney-Fees in Class Action 
Settlements: An Empirical Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004) reviewed 
class action awards from 1993 to 2002 and found that the average award was $139 
million and that the average award in the top ten percent of awards was $1.08 billion. 
There are several reasons to believe that the Eisenberg-Miller numbers underestimate 
the true magnitude of class action judgments and settlements.  See GEORGE L. PRIEST, 
WHAT WE KNOW, AND DON’T KNOW ABOUT MODERN CLASS ACTIONS: A REVIEW OF 
THE EISENBURG-MILLER STUDY, MANHATTAN INSTITUTE CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT 9 
(2005). 
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settlements in class actions at enormous sums of money 
where there appears to be no substantive basis for defendant 
liability.64 
 
In this unfortunate strategic game – what we call the settlement holdup 
game – defendants settle even cases that they would probably win on the 
merits.  The game is played, successfully, against both large and small 
companies.  Small companies often settle when they believe they have a 
good chance of winning at trial because they cannot risk the potential 
loss of their business and everything they own; large firms because 
settlements remove the specter of potential liability that depresses market 
value.65  
 As noted earlier and explained in more detail below, the FTC Act 
requires the Commission to consider the public interest (which is now 
manifest in the consumer welfare standard) in deciding whether to 
challenge a practice as false or deceptive.  By contrast, only a few states 
attempt to discipline the incentives of private attorneys by including a 
public interest requirement for private CPA actions.66 However opaque 
 
64 GEORGE L. PRIEST, WHAT WE KNOW, AND DON’T KNOW ABOUT MODERN 
CLASS ACTIONS: A REVIEW OF THE EISENBURG-MILLER STUDY, MANHATTAN 
INSTITUTE CIVIL JUSTICE REPORT 9 (2005) (footnotes omitted). 
65 See H.R. Rep. No. 106-320, at 8 (1999) (“Too frequently, corporate 
decisionmakers are confronted with the implacable arithmetic of the class action: even a 
meritless case with only a 5% chance of success at trial must be settled if the complaint 
claims hundreds of millions of dollars in damages.” Citing testimony of John L. 
McGoldrick, Esq., Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company, Hearing before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, "Mass Torts and Class Action Lawsuits" (March 9, 
1998).) [add Merck/Vioxx settlement example and refer back to small business UCL 
cases]. 
66 See Hall v. Walter, 969 P.2d 234 (the practice challenged by an individual under 
Colo. Rev. State. § 6-1-113 (1998) must significantly impact the public as actual or 
potential consumers); Zeeman v. Black, 156 Ga. App. 82, 84, 273 S.E.2d 910, 915 
(1980) (stating that unless the defendant’s actions had or has potential harm for the 
consumer public they are not directly regulated by the FBPA, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-3-0 et. 
seq.); Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2000) (public interest must be 
demonstrated to state a claim under the private A.G. statute – relating to the CFA, 
Minn. Stat. § 325F.68 et. seq.); Nelson v. Lusterstone Surfacing Co., 258 Neb. 678, 605 
N.W.2d 136 (2000) (to be actionable under the CPA the unfair/deception act must have 
impact on the public interest); Jefferies v. Phillips, 316 S.C. 523, 451 S.E.2d 21, 1994 
S.C. App. Lexis 139 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994) (to be actionable under SCUPTA, S.C. Code 
§ 39-5-20, unfair or deceptive practices  must adversely affect the public interest); 
Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d 778, 719 
P.2d 531 (1986) (private litigant must establish a public interest impact to establish a 
prima facie case under the CPA, Rev. Code Wash. § 19.86.010 et. seq.). 
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may be the mix of professional and political concerns that motivate FTC 
Commissioners, private attorneys who enforce state CPAs are simply not 
bound by the same practical and legislative constraints that apply to FTC 
regulators.67 The great divergence in incentives in filing suit between 
private and public law enforcers is strikingly illustrated by California’s 
experience with the allegedly extortionate practice engaged in by some 
notorious class action firms of suing hundreds or even thousands of 
small businesses for technical regulatory violations (e.g. auto shops 
sometimes forgetting to give customers copies of their estimates, nail 
salons using the same nail polish bottle more than once). As the 
regulatory net has become increasingly dense and overwhelming for 
business, there are more and more technical regulatory violations that 
typically lead to little or no harm. Presumably one reason why the 
legislatures of California, and other states, have vested direct regulatory 
enforcement authority in public agencies is because those legislatures 
trust the agencies to use their discretion in the public interest, refraining 
from enforcing against violations that cause de minimus harm and truly 
are technical in nature.    Private class action attorneys are not guided by 
the same principles of discretion, and indeed are incentivized by the 
restitutionary remedial schemes and the prospect of recovering attorneys 
fees offered by state CPAs to bring CPA actions that are grounded in 
precisely the sort of technical regulatory violations that public regulators 
would overlook.  Such private actions carry with them a very real 
likelihood of inefficient over-enforcement: enforcement that is not 
justified by the value of deterring the practices that are targeted for 
enforcement, because those practices cause little or no harm.68   
 
D.  Expansive Judicial Interpretation of the Concept of “Unfair and 
Deceptive” and the Potentially Chilling and Taxing Impact of State 
CPA Liability. 
 
Although it is conceivable that the private interests of CPA class 
action litigants will further the public interest as if guided by an 
 
67 See, e.g., Sovern, supra, note 20, at 452.   
68 As aptly put by Stephen B. Burbank, Aggregation on the Couch: The Strategic 
Uses of Ambiguity and Hypocrisy, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1924, 1930 (2006), “[a]lthough 
the concept of inefficient overenforcement is a tool of economic analysis of law, when 
applied to a particular statute, it surely must start with the level of enforcement sought 
by the legislature, which may be inferable from the legislature’s attention or inattention 
to  the background or ancillary rules and institutions that determine the real value of 
legal rights.”  
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“invisible hand,” achievement of such a public interest goal obviously 
hinges in large part ultimately on what kinds of practices can trigger 
liability under a state CPA.  Assuming – as we do throughout this part – 
that some form of CPA liability is necessary to supplement common law 
and market forces that discipline deceptive and misleading practices in 
marketing consumer goods, it remains important that the CPA liability 
process effectively focuses liability on truly misleading and deceptive 
practices. From the point of view of optimally deterring false and 
misleading consumer marketing practices, problems arise both from an 
under-inclusive CPA liability regime – one that attaches liability to too 
few such practices – and one that is over-inclusive – threatening CPA 
liability even for marketing and advertising which is on balance 
informative and socially desirable (or at least innocuous).    
As currently interpreted by the courts, the problem of over-
inclusive CPA liability is we believe very real, with potentially seriously 
deleterious consequences not only for companies that make and market 
consumer products and services but for consumers themselves.  In the 
FTC Act and “little FTC” acts, both Congress and the state legislatures 
left the definitions of “unfair” and “deceptive” vague, but they chose 
different paths to determining the meaning of the terms.  Congress 
empowered the FTC to use its expertise to determine the meaning of 
unfair and deceptive,69 while most state legislatures have chosen to not 
have effective administrative agencies to develop expertise in the 
definition and enforcement of illegal acts.  Instead, state legislatures have 
relied on judicial interpretation through private litigation to define the 
terms.   The FTC has by regulation adopted a method of determining 
whether a practice is “false, unfair and deceptive” that takes account of 
the costs and benefits of regulatory relief and quite openly seeks to 
maximize consumer welfare.70  State courts are highly unlikely to exhibit 
the same degree of expertise in interpreting statutory language as a 
specialized federal agency.71  Yet, many states seem to have ignored this 
crucial difference and did not provide the courts – and, perhaps more 
importantly, businesses – with needed guidance as to what constitutes an 
 
69 Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006)). 
70 See discussion infra notes __ to __. 
71 See, e.g. Muris, supra note , at 16 (“[A]dministrative agencies, like the FTC, 
have developed areas of expertise, such as interpreting implied claims in advertising, 
that provide an advantage over courts when ruling on consumer matters involving 
certain complex issues.”).   
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unfair or deceptive practice.  The result of this drafting is a freewheeling 
set of interpretations that are difficult to reconcile with consumer 
welfare.  In section, we provide examples of some such interpretations, 
and then explain in more detail the adverse economic consequences from 
these interpretations.  
 
1.  The Expansive Interpretation of “Unfair and Deceptive” 
under State CPA’s 
 
The types of lawsuits filed under state CPAs are the stuff of 
newspaper headlines and nightly news stories:  former administrative 
law judge Roy Pearson Jr.’s $54 million suit – brought under the District 
of Columbia CPA – against a family-owned dry cleaning store for losing 
his pants, thereby causing its “Satisfaction Guaranteed” sign to constitute 
a false and deceptive practice;72 a suit – also under the District of 
Columbia’s CPA -- on behalf of people who consumed milk without 
knowing that they were lactose intolerant alleging that it was false and 
deceptive for sellers of milk to fail to warn them of the adverse effects 
that lactose intolerant people suffer when they drink milk;73 suits 
brought under California’s CPA against auto dealers for technical 
regulatory violations, such as using the abbreviation “APR” instead of 
“Annual Percentage Rate,”;74 a suit alleging that a Fresno, California fast 
food restaurant engaged in an unfair practice by placing a restroom 
mirror an inch higher that is permitted under the federal Americans with 
Disabilities Act.75  The allegations in these and many other such suits 
depict either trivial regulatory violations, marketing communications that 
are very general and imprecise and unlikely to deceive any typical 
consumer (“Satisfaction Guaranteed”), or a failure to communicate 
information that should be obvious to any consumer who knows his or 
her own personal characteristics (that lactose intolerant people will suffer 
adverse effects if they drink regular milk).  They seem clearly to fall 
short of meeting almost any sensible standard of what might constitute a 
“false and deceptive” practice. 
To their credit, courts have often dismissed such lawsuits on their 
 
72 Pearson v. Chung, 961 A.2d 1067 (D.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
73 Mills v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 441 F.Supp.2d 104 (D.C. D.C. 2006). 
74 ATR, Private Consumer Protection Lawsuit Abuse, supra note __ at 9. 
75 ATR, Private Consumer Protection Lawsuit Abuse, supra note __ at 9. 
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pleadings, refusing to permit plaintiffs to get anywhere near a jury.76  
Yet dismissals of even such seemingly egregious cases are at least 
sometimes appealed.77  And such appeals are far from frivolous, because 
it is easy to find cases that are just as far-fetched on their factual 
allegations that have survived not only dismissal but appeal.   In Johnson 
v. Hewlett Packard Co,78 for example, the plaintiff alleged that Hewlett-
Packard brochures that described its printers as including a free 
“economy” ink cartridge were deceptive because the free cartridges 
contained only half as much ink as a normal cartridge, forcing consumers 
to have to buy replacement cartridges sooner than they expected.  The 
trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant, finding that the 
company had truthfully disclosed that the free cartridge was an 
“economy” cartridge, but the appellate court reversed on the ground that 
there was a triable issue of fact over how most buyers would have 
understood the phrase “economy cartridge.”79  
Similarly, in one of the most highly publicized recent CPA cases 
in California, Benson v. Kwikset Corp,80 the plaintiff alleged that 
although the deadbolts, doorknobs and door handle sets (a category 
referred to as “locksets”) sold by Kwikset were assembled in its U.S 
plants, because some of Kwiksets products included some screws or pins 
made in Taiwan and a latch part made at its plant in Mexico,  labels on 
Kwikset product stating “Made in U.S.A.” or “All American Made” 
constituted an “unlawful” and “unfair” business practice under the 
California CPA.81  This claim made it to a bench trial, where the plaintiff 
 
76 See, e.g., Mills v. Giant of Maryland, and Pearson v. Chung, supra note __.  See 
also Bivens v. Gallery Corp., 134 Cal. App. 4th 847 (2006)(upholding dismissal of 
complaint alleging that a newspaper advertisement for twin matteresses showing a 
woman on a mattress, stating a unit price, and also stating both “TWIN EA. PC” and 
“SOLD IN SETS ONLY” was misleading because it failed to give the total price for 
twin sets.)  
77 See cases cited supra note 65. 
78 No. CX-01-1641, 2002 WL 1050426 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
79 This description is taken from Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, 
92 Va. L. Rev. 565, 614-615. 
80 Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 126 Cal. App. 4th 887 (Ct. App. 2005), as modified on 
denial of rehearing 152 Cal. App. 4th 1254 (Ct. App. 2007). 
81 In particular, California’s Unfair Competition Law, Civ. Code §§17200 et. seq. 
that create a right to restitutionary and injunctive relief against any “unlawful, unfair or 
fraudulent business practice or practice…” Plaintiff also alleged that such labels 
violated a provision of California’s false advertising law that makes in unlawful to sell 
products that are labeled with “the words ‘Made in U.S.A.,’ ‘Made in America,’ 
‘U.S.A.’ or similar words when the merchandise or any article, unit, or part thereof, has 
been entirely or substantially made, manufactured, or produced outside of the United 
States.” 
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presented witnesses who testified that because they interpreted a “Made 
in U.S.A.” label to mean that “all of the parts and all of the labor used to 
manufacture the product occurred” in the U.S., they felt deceived by the 
labels on Kwikset products.82 The trial judge found that “a lockset 
incorporating a latch assembly that was sub-assembled in Mexico is 
deceptively labeled with either designation” and that “locksets that 
incorporate only a few screws or pins made in Taiwan are not 
deceptively labeled with a ‘Made in U.S.A.’ label,  but are deceptively 
labeled with an ‘All American Made’ label.”83  The trial court enjoined 
Kwikset’s use of the supposedly misleading labels, ordered it to allow 
retailers to return the “mislabeled” locksets for either a refund or 
replacement, and awarded plaintiff statutorily authorized costs plus 
attorney’s fees.84 Thus although Kwikset might seem to be a case that at 
the very least pushes the boundaries of what could reasonably be 
considered to be false or misleading mass market consumer 
communications, it is a case that the plaintiff actually won.  
Although California’s Proposition 64 – establishing an injury 
requirement for plaintiffs to establish standing under both California’s 
unfair competition and false advertising laws – was passed during the 
pendency of the Kwikset, that Proposition seems unlikely to affect the 
outcome: after a trial, the judge found that at least one of the labels was 
misleading to consumers in general, one of whom the plaintiff could 
easily assert himself to be.85 There is little doubt that Proposition 64 has 
been successful to some extent, because there are already a large number 
of reported decisions in which Proposition 64’s injury requirement has 
led to the early dismissal of many patently frivolous suits that might well 
otherwise have proceeded through discovery.86 Yet in many cases that 
seem equally far-fetched, plaintiffs have managed to at least 
satisfactorily plead injury, leaving judicial interpretation and 
implementation of the substantive standard of “unfair, false and 
 
 
82 Benson v. Kwikset, 24 Cal.Rptr. 683, 691. 
83 Benson v. Kwikset, 24 Cal.Rptr. 683, 692. 
84 Benson v. Kwikset, 24 Cal.Rptr. 683, 690. 
85 More precisely, in Benson v. Kwikset, 152 Cal.App.4th 1254, 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
284, 290-291 (2007), Benson was allowed to amend his complaint so as to plead facts 
satisfying Proposition 64’s standing requirement. 
86 See, e.g., O’Brien v. Camisasca Automotive Manufacturing, Inc., 161 
Cal.App.4th 388 (Ct. App. 2008)(plaintiff alleged that license plate frames were falsely 
labeled as “Made in U.S.A.” but failed to plead that he ever saw such a label before he 
purchases his frame.) 
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deceptive” as the key determinant of whether such claims are dismissed 
quickly or instead become the fodder for the class action settlement hold-
up game described above.   
For example, in Paduano v. American Honda Motor Co.87, the 
plaintiff said that in deciding to purchase a 2004 Honda Civic Hybrid, he 
read and relied upon a number of allegedly misleading claims about fuel 
economy made in the Hybrid sales brochure. 88  These claims included a 
highlighted EPA estimate of 51 mpg for the manual transmission version 
of the hybrid, an image of text reading “51 mpg” in large yellow font, 
with smaller foreground text beginning “with impressive fuel economy 
of 51 mpg,” and statements in the brochure stating “just drive the Hybrid 
like you would a conventional car and save on fuel bills,” and “IS 
THERE ANYTHING SPECIAL YOU HAVE TO DO? You just have to 
love saving money and getting terrific gas mileage.”89 Since the EPA 
estimate for this make and model was indeed 51 mpg, and since the 
brochure clearly stated that this was for the manual transmission – not 
the automatic that Paduano bought – the trial court had no difficulty in 
concluding as a matter of law that there was nothing false or misleading 
in Honda’s advertising statements that identified the EPA estimated 
mileage.90  However, the trial court found that there was a triable issue 
of fact was raised by Paduano’s assertion that Honda had misled him by 
stating that a consumer could achieve the EPA mileage just by “driv[ing] 
the Hybrid like…a conventional car.”  These fact issues were raised, 
according to the trial court, by evidence introduced by Paduano that a 
Honda representative told him that the mileage tests used to derive EPA 
estimates “were developed over 30 years ago and do not reflect real 
driving situations, let alone driving habits of consumers in the modern 
day” and that another Honda representative told him that to get the high 
advertised fuel efficiency, “one would have to drive a hybrid vehicle in a 
manner quite different from the manner in which one would drive a 
conventional vehicle.”91 Remarkably enough, on appeal, the trial court 
 
87 169 Cal. App. 4th 1453,  88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90 (Ct. App. 2009). 
88 Paduano, supra note __ at 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d  
89 Paduano, supra note __ at 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90, 97, 104-105. 
90 Paduano, supra note __ at 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90, 105. 
91 Paduano, supra note __ at 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90, 105.  As the trial court explained: 
“[t]he tests do not take Hyrid vehicles into consideration, and Hybrid vehicle estimates 
are inflated ased on the test procedures. Honda told [Paduano that] Hybrid vehicles are 
more dramatically effected by outside influences such as air conditioning, driving 
habits, windows up/down, and vehicle load than normal combustion engines.  Only 
after purchase did Honda [tell Paduano that] Hybrids require a particular driving style 
  25
                                                                                                                      
decision to deny summary judgment was upheld by the majority.  
What is most remarkable about the Paduano decision is that it 
has apparently been well known for many years that EPA mpg ratings 
may systematically overstate the mileage that drivers will obtain, and not 
just from hybrids.92  Moreover, apparently both Honda and Toyota had 
become aware – through customer complaints – that their hybrids were 
not getting the EPA-estimated mileage and had in fact contacted the EPA 
to try to get revised EPA estimates that were more in line with the 
mileage that customers were actually reporting.93  At its most essential 
level, the Paduano case got past summary judgment on the strength of 
the argument that Honda failed to tell drivers that hybrids were new and 
different and that methodology used by the government to get its mileage 
estimates would not necessarily be accurate.  But as the dissenting 
appellate judges (Haller and O’Rourke) in Paduano powerfully argued, 
this is far cry from allowing to find that what Honda did say was 
misleading or deceptive: 
 
“…the Honda brochure’s assertion as to driving the Hybrid 
conventionally and saving on fuel bills is true and basically 
definitional.  By its nature, a hybrid vehicle ‘saves on fuel’ (i.e. 
gasoline) because there are times while driving that the gasoline 
engine cuts off.  The brochure itself points out that the electric motor 
adds its power to the output of the gasoline engine while 
accelerating, and also that ‘At a stop, the engine cuts of 
automatically under most conditions to reduce fuel use and 
emissions, thanks to the idle-stop feature.  It restarts itself when 
you’re ready to go’ Paduano himself admitted in his deposition that 
any car’s gas mileage would decrease with aggressive driving.  His 
own deposition testimony bolsters the conclusion that Honda’s 
suggestion about driving the hybrid Civic like a conventional car is 
not likely to mislead a reasonable consumer….the statement ‘just 
drive the car like you would a conventional car and save on fuel 
bills’ relates not to driving style (aggressive versus non-aggressive 
driving) but to the absence of any need to plug the car into an outlet.  
 
in order to be fuel efficient, and short trips penalize hybrid efficiency more so than 
regular cars.”  Id. 
92 See Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and 
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 Va. L. Rev. 565, 588 (2006) 
93 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90, 97. 
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Nevertheless, the majority’s theory – that the brochure is misleading 
because it suggests a person can drive the car in a ‘normal’ or 
conventional manner and still get fuel economy close to the EPA 
estimate…necessarily depends on plaintiff’s reliance on the 
accuracy of the EPA estimates set forth in the brochure.  But as the 
majority holds, such a claim is not actionable!”94 
 
2. Economic Consequences of the Highly Uncertain and 
Expansive State CPA Substantive Liability Standard 
 
The incentive effects created by state CPA liability are a function 
of two things: the probability that such a suit will be brought, and the 
relationship between manufacturer/marketer behavior and the probability 
of liability given that suit is brought.   We argued earlier that, especially 
when coupled with the class action procedural device, even CPA suits 
with a relatively low probability of success on the merits may be 
economically worthwhile for plaintiffs’ attorneys to file.   The likelihood 
of success on the merits – and, more precisely, how the manufacturer’s 
ex ante choices influence its probability of ex post liability – is a 
fundamental determinant of the ex ante incentives created by any legal 
liability system.  In the case of CPAs, liability under the substantive 
“unfair and deceptive” standard is likely so expansive and uncertain that 
its likely effect is to both chill and tax socially desirable 
manufacturer/marketer communication to consumers    
In this section, we explain why this is so.  To do so, we begin by 
recalling some basic results from the law and economics literature on the 
incentive effects of alternative types of liability regimes in the classic 
tort case, where a potential injurer (car driver, manufacturer) is choosing 
how careful to be to reduce the probability of harm.   A mass marketer’s 
choice about how and what to communicate to consumers is, however, 
quite different than the choice of precautions that is the focus of the 
canonical law and economics model.  We explain how this difference is 
likely to lead to a socially undesirable chilling of mass market consumer 
communication.  Importantly, unlike the generic precautions typically 
considered in the canonical economic model of legal incentives, a 
consumer product marketer does not necessarily lower its liability by 
doing more – by disclosing more, and in greater detail – in its 
communication to consumers.  For this reason, CPA liability may well 
 
94 88 Cal. Rptr. 3d 90, 127-128. 
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amount to an inescapable but risky tax that accompanies any mass 
market consumer communication.   
 
a. The Model of Precautions95  
 
We begin by reviewing some of the basic law and economics of 
tort law incentives. At one extreme, one can imagine an economically 
ideal fault-based liability system.  Such a system is one in which the 
manufacturer would face a 100 percent chance of liability if its behavior 
was economically suboptimal, and a 0 percent chance of liability if its 
behavior was economically optimal.  At the other extreme, one can 
imagine a regime of absolute fault, in which the manufacturer is liable 
for damages in the event the consumer suffers harm regardless of what 
the manufacturer said or did.    
One of the early and most fundamental results in law and 
economics is that both regimes – economically ideal fault-based liability 
and absolute liability – create an incentive for potential injurers to take 
optimal care to lower the probability of accidental harm.96  Essentially, 
under either regime, the manufacturer internalizes the full social costs of 
its choices if it takes less than optimal care, and so both regimes equate 
private and social costs for less than optimal care.  The difference 
between the two regimes comes in the distribution of the cost of 
accidents given optimal care by the manufacturer: under absolute 
liability, the manufacturer bears the cost of accidents even if it takes 
optimal care, while under ideal fault-based liability, the manufacturer 
takes optimal care but, given that choice, is never found liable and so 
victims are left bearing their own costs.  
These two regimes – ideal fault-based liability and absolute 
liability – are highly simplified, theoretical liability regimes.   Fault-
based liability is not, of course ideal.   Rather than a regime in which the 
manufacturer perceives 0 chance of liability if it takes optimal care and a 
100 percent chance of liability if it fails to take optimal care, the more 
realistic situation is likely to be one in which a manufacturer perceives 
 
95 See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of 
Precaution," 73 California Law Review 1 (1985); .Steven  Shavell, Economic Analysis 
of Accident Law (1987).   
96 See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law (1987); Robert D. 
Cooter and Thomas Ulen, An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence, 61 New 
York University Law Review 1067 (1987). 
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that there may always be some positive probability of liability, no matter 
what it does, but that the probability of liability will fall, the more careful 
was its actual ex ante behavior.   Such a regime is, from an economic 
point of view, imperfect, but it is nonetheless rational, in that the more 
careful the ex ante behavior, the lower the chance of ex post liability.  
However rational, such a regime creates too strong an incentive for 
manufacturer precautions. The reason is that under such a regime, the 
manufacturer (or more generally, injurer) gets what is in effect a double 
marginal benefit from care-taking: it lowers the probability that a 
consumer suffers harm, and it also lowers its chances of being found 
liable if such harm occurs. Economic theory predicts that under very 
general conditions, this double marginal benefit leads to excessive 
precautions. 97  This theoretical prediction has, moreover, been 
confirmed by empirical work in the medical malpractice area that has 
found evidence that uncertain malpractice liability has caused physicians 
to practice defensive medicine: excessive levels of treatment that are 
ordered primarily to lower the risk of liability,  rather than to improve 
patient outcomes.98 
Importantly, such imperfect fault-based liability regimes are quite 
similar to strict liability, in that they generally leave a manufacturer 
facing some positive probability of liability no matter what its choice.   
Like strict liability, therefore, the incentive effects of fault-based liability 
regimes are highly sensitive to the damage measure.  In an ideal fault-
based liability regime, where a manufacturer is sure that it will not be 
held liable if it does the “reasonable” thing, the measure of damages is – 
in equilibrium – irrelevant, because the manufacturer’s ex ante behavior 
is always economically optimal (which is equivalent to legally 
“reasonable” in an economically optimal legal regime) and therefore the 
manufacturer doesn’t pay damages anyway.  But in a more realistic, 
imperfect fault-based regime, the manufacturer is generally too careful, 
but also generally still faces a positive chance of liability.  Hence under 
 
97 For this result, see Richard Craswell and John E. Calfee, Some Effects of 
Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 Virginia Law Review 965 (1984); 
Richard Craswell and John E. Calfree, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 
JLEO 279 (1986); and Jason Scott Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Finding and Efficiency:  
Toward An Economic Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 Southern California 
Law Review 137-181 (1987). 
98 See Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive 
Medicine?, 111 Q.J. Econ. 353, 356, 385-88 (1996) (concluding that, absent limitations 
on liability, doctors provide excessively costly treatment) 
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such an imperfect regime, the prospect of paying extraordinary damages 
(statutory damages greater than actual harm, double or treble damages, 
or punitive damages) will add to the risk of overdeterrence.  Only if one 
is sure that there is little or no risk that economically reasonable behavior 
will be punished with punitive damages can one assume that imposing 
punitive damages in an imperfect fault-based regime will not lead to 
significant overdeterrence. 
 
b. The Model of Precautions Extended to CPA Liability for 
“False” and “Misleading” Selling Practices and Communications 
 
The perceptive reader may well have been asking herself whether 
the simple economic model of precautions that we have just described 
can be usefully applied to the kind of behavior that subject 
manufacturers and other mass consumer marketers to potential liability 
under CPAs. After all, the typical CPA case that we described earlier 
does not involve the question of whether the defendant mass marketer 
took reasonable precautions to lower the risk of a harmful accident, but 
rather whether the mass marketer’s communication (or marketing 
practices more generally) was “deceptive” or “unfair.”  In this section, 
we extend the economic analysis of incentives under fault-based liability 
regimes to the choices that potentially trigger liability under CPAs. 
A wide variety of conduct has the potential to trigger CPA 
liability.  Here we are interested in two categories of conduct: selling 
practices and marketing communications (including advertising).  In the 
category of selling practices, we place choices such as how big a box in 
which to put consumer software, or whether or not to reuse nail polish.   
In the category of communications, we place behavior ranging from 
simple “Satisfaction Guaranteed” signs to claims about the mpg rating of 
a Honda hybrid made in product brochures.   Also in the communication 
category are included cases where the allegation was not that what was 
said was misleading but that too little was said.  These cases would 
include those such as that where the plaintiffs claimed that milk 
producers had violated the District of Columbia CPA by failing to warn 
lactose intolerant people of the adverse side effects that they would incur 
from drinking milk.   
The harm that CPAs seek to avoid occurs when consumers are 
deceived or misled into buying products (or services) that are not those 
that they believed they were buying.  Hence the question when the 
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economic model of precautions is applied to the CPA context is how 
potential CPA liability influences the incentives of sellers of consumer 
products and services to take action to reduce the probability that their 
selling practices or communications will cause consumers to be misled.    
In the case of selling practices, the kinds of practices that are 
amenable to attack under state CPAs seem to be limited only by the 
imaginations of class action attorneys.   If putting software disks in 
boxes and reusing nail polish can be misleading, then it is because of a 
background assumption about what consumers are thinking: that there is 
not a lot of extra space in a box with software disks (that it is more or 
less full or disks) and that every time a nail salon does a customer’s 
nails, it is using a new bottle of nail polish.  Whether these assumptions 
are reasonable reflections of what any consumer actually thinks cannot 
be determined ex ante.  What we think that cases like these clearly do is 
to tell firms that sell consumer products or services that virtually 
anything they do could trigger potential CPA liability.  If virtually any 
selling practice can trigger liability, then there is no particular 
“precautionary” selling practice that a seller can adopt to lessen the 
chance of liability. If this is so, then the only effective precaution that 
can be taken to reduce potential liability for selling practices is to get out 
of the business of selling directly to consumers.  For firms who stay in 
the business of selling to consumers, CPA liability acts like a tax that 
accompanies every decision to sell directly to consumers.  
Consider next the model of precautions as applied to consumer 
communications.  Here the problem is that there is potential CPA 
liability for saying too much – as about the EPA-estimate mph for Honda 
hybrids – and saying too little – as in failing to warn lactose intolerant 
people that they will suffer adverse physical effects if they drink milk.  
Moreover, there is also potential liability if statements are insufficiently 
complete – as in saying that a door knob is “Made in the U.S.A.” when it 
contains screws made in Taiwan.    The standard case presumed in the 
economic model of precautions is one in which by taking more 
precautions, the actor lowers the risk of both social harm and that it will 
incur private liability.  But with CPA liability, firms do not necessarily 
lower their liability by saying more in their consumer communications. 
Nor do they necessarily lower their liability by saying less, or even by 
saying nothing (since there may be a duty to disclose under the CPAs).   
Perhaps it is only by making extremely detailed and highly cautionary 
disclosures – to the effect that certain consumers may find that the 
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product or service is not to their liking, for various and sundry 
enumerated reasons – could a seller actually shape its marketing 
communications and advertising so as to lower its risk of CPA liability.  
The problem confronting a seller who is honestly trying to devise 
advertising disclosures that inform but do not mislead consumers is a 
hard one: recent studies have shown, for example, that prominently 
disclosing one product attribute may reduce consumers’ understanding or 
recall of other information disclosed in the very same ad.99  Consistent 
with this evidence from the marketing literature, as we explain in more 
detail in the next section, in an economically relevant sense, such highly 
qualified and conditional seller communications may actually lessen the 
dissemination of useful information to consumers.100  
To our knowledge, there is no systematic empirical evidence that 
details the extent of such a chilling effect of potential CPA liability on 
consumer communications and advertising.  However, there are well-
known cases in which CPA liability has had precisely the effect that we 
predict.  Perhaps the most famous is Nike v. Kasky.101  In the late 1990’s, 
Nike was besieged with accusations that its products were manufactured 
in overseas sweatshops.  Nike responded with a flurry of press releases, 
 
99 Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note __, 92 Va. L. Rev. 565, 583. 
100 For an analysis that suggests that a CPA statute that broadly defines “deceptive” 
and “unfair” behavior may excessively restrict the dissemination of useful information 
to consumers. Thomas Holdych, Standards for Establishing Deceptive Conduct Under 
State Deceptive Trade Practices Statutes That Impose Punitive Remedies, 73 OR. L. 
REV. 235 (1994) (“[A]pplying a pure negligence standard to determine the liability of 
an information source for causing false beliefs to be derived from ambiguous or vague 
communications may result in overdeterrence and reduce the amount of information 
produced or cause excessive care.”).  When a statute fails to clearly distinguish between 
deceptive and non-deceptive conduct, the latter may be punished when to do so would 
be inappropriate.  The fear that consumer protection statutes will deter useful 
commercial activity has led some courts to become hostile to consumer protection 
claims.  See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: 
Reconsidering the FTC Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 437, 457 (1991).  Critics 
argue that a statutory regime that imposes punitive remedies for offenses defined so 
broadly is too harsh. Merchants who engage in false advertising by virtue of an honest 
mistake or typographical error may be punished unduly.  See, e.g., Geismar v. Abraham 
& Strauss, 439 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (N.Y.Dist.Ct. 1981).  Also, see Muris, supra note  at 33 
(“Unduly expansive principles of deception can impede vigorous competition …”). 
101 Nike v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). is a prime example of consumer protection 
statutes being used to infringe on a merchant’s right to free speech. Theodore B. Olson, 
then Solicitor General, argued to the Supreme Court that the fundamental principle of 
free speech was put in jeopardy when the “self limiting principles” of common law 
actions are disregarded.  See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 




                                                
letters to the editors and also commissioned a former U.N. ambassador to 
write a report on the labor conditions in Nike’s overseas factories.  Labor 
activist Mark Kasky filed a suit against Nike under California’s Unfair 
Competition and False Advertising laws on behalf of the general public, 
alleging that Nike’s statements about its treatment of its workers 
amounted to a violation of California’s deceptive trade practices law.   
Nike argued that the application of these California CPA laws to its 
commercial speech infringed the First Amendment.   This challenge was 
rejected by the California Supreme Court,102 and although the Supreme 
Court of the United States originally took certiorari on the First 
Amendment issue, a majority of the Court then changed their minds and 
reversed the grant.103  After this, the case settled, with Nike agreeing to 
pay several million dollars to a D.C. based international labor rights non-
governmental organization.  For present purposes, what is most 
important about Nike v. Kasky is the immediate chilling impact it had on 
Nike’s communications: as soon as the case was filed, Nike stopped 
issuing its annual Corporate Social Responsibility reports104 and making 
claims regarding its labor and environmental practices. This self-
imposed speech moratorium lasted several years, and when Nike 
resumed communications regarding its labor practices, it was careful not 
to assert anything about labor conditions, but instead simply posted 
online a list with its suppliers’ names and locations.105  
Another example of the chilling effect of potential CPA liability 
on communications with consumers is provided by Benson v. Kwikset.106   
As soon as Benson filed his CPA suit in 2000, Kwikset ceased “all use of 
the USA designations on their locksets.”107 As we explain below, when 
firms are deterred by CPA liability from communicating information to 
consumers, both firms and consumers suffer adverse consequences in the 
 
102 Kasky v. Nike Inc., 119 Cal. Rptr. 296 (2002). 
103 Nike Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S.Ct. 2554 (2003). 
104 In Nike v. Kasky, 123 S.Ct. 2554, 2568, Nike asserted without contradiction 
that due to Kasky’s suit, it had already begun to restrict “severely” its communications 
on social issues that could reach “California consumers,” refused “dozens of 
invitations…to speak on corporate social responsibility issues,” delayed release of its 
annual Corporate Social Responsibility Report, and decided against trying to get its 
stock listed on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (an index used by socially 
responsible and “green” mutual funds in screening stocks for inclusion in their 
portfolios).  
105 See Michael Skapinker, Nike Ushers in a New Age of Corporate Responsibility, 
Financial Times, 8, April 20, 2005. 
106 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 284. 
107 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 284, 292. 
 
  33
                                                
form of lost sales that would have generated positive gains from trade for 
both.   
There is a final impact of potential CPA liability under the 
expansive construction of “false and deceptive” that becomes clear when 
we recognize that in the case of consumer products and services, 
precautions are two-sided.   It is not only what the seller says or how it 
markets its goods and services that determines what consumers know or 
do not know about the product before they buy it; consumers also have 
an opportunity to in effect take precautions by becoming informed about 
the product or service, about the seller, and about the seller’s reputation 
before they make a purchase.  There is a fundamental tradeoff between 
providing remedies to allegedly deceived consumers and giving 
consumers the incentive to investigate and protect themselves.108  If 
consumers expect to be made whole when ill-advised decisions have bad 
consequences, then they have less incentive to be reasonably cautious.109  
The FTC clearly recognizes these concerns in its definitions of unfair 
and deceptive.  Unfortunately, there is no mechanism to tradeoff costs 
and benefits under state CPAs. 
 
c.  The Impact of Uncertain CPA Liability on Consumer Welfare  
 
From the previous discussion, there are at least two serious 
impacts of expansive and uncertain potential CPA liability on the market 
for consumer goods and services: first, the imposition of what is 
effectively a tax on every good or service sold to consumers; second, the 
 
108 See Hadfield et al., p. 26 (“Other contract doctrines protective of consumer 
interests generate tradeoffs in terms of the creation of incentives for consumers to 
become informed.  Consumer information up front may be a more efficient way to 
avoid bad bargains than ex post relief and yet relief for various forms of mistake and 
misrepresentation may create inadequate incentives for consumers to bear the costs of 
becoming informed.”). 
109 Hadfield et al., near note 25 (“ Perhaps the most important insight coming from 
the analysis of information in markets again relates to transactions costs.  Information is 
costly so consumers rationally make choices between being better informed and settling 
for a less-informed but less (transaction) costly option. Consumer protection policy that 
is intended to alleviate the information problems that run through consumer markets, 
then, must address this underlying tradeoff.  Protective measures that are as costly as 
the self-protective measure of gathering more information do not go to the heart of the 
problem; nor do regulatory techniques in which the cost of regulation (both direct costs 
and the indirect costs implied by the strategic response to the regulation) exceeds the 
cost of becoming informed and thus, by hypothesis, the value to a consumer of a more 
informed choice.  In general, the transaction cost insight is that information costs are 
endemic to both markets and regulatory techniques; wise regulation must be designed 
with a clear understanding of the relative costs of the problem and the solution.”). 
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imposition of potential liability for consumer communications and 
advertising, liability that may well have the effect of either chilling 
informative communication and/or inducing sellers to make such 
communications both much more detailed and much more cautionary 
and discouraging.  In this section, we trace the consequences for 
consumer welfare of these two effects. 
 
(i) The Welfare Loss from CPA Liability as an Excise Tax 
First, and most simply is the direct impact CPA liability has in 
imposing what is essentially an excise tax on each and every consumer 
sale.  Generally speaking, excise taxes are imposed on luxury goods 
(airplanes, boats) and on goods whose consumption the government 
wishes to reduce, such as cigarettes.   The reason is that excise taxes 
increase seller costs, which leads to an increase in price and reduction in 
quantity demanded and consumed.  In the case of competitive markets, 
the excise tax has two consequences for the economic welfare of sellers 
and consumers.  These consequences are depicted in Figure 1 below.  
Figure 1 depicts the consequences of imposing expected CPA liability in 
the amount L on every sale of a generic good or service.110  As shown by 
Figure 1, the market effects of imposing this liability/tax is to reduce the 
equilibrium market quantity consumed from Q to QL and to increase the 
equilibrium price from P to PL. 
 
[Figure 1 About here] 
 
The first consumer welfare consequence of the CPA liability as 
an excise tax is to simply price some consumers out of the market for the 
product. Consumers whose willingness to pay is bigger than P but less 
than PL  are those who would buy the product if expected CPA liability 
were not added to its cost, but who will not when CPA liability is 
imposed.  
The second consequence of CPA liability for consumer welfare is 
that consumers are now worse off because they have to bear part of the 
price increase due to the increase in seller costs due to CPA liability.   
More precisely, consumers who remain in the market and continue to 
buy the good are now worse off by an amount equal to the increase in 
price (PL - P) multiplied by the quantity consumed with CPA liability 
 
110 This analysis was classically presented by Robert L. Bishop, The Effects of 
Specific and Ad Valorem Taxes, 82 Quart. J. Econ. 198 (1968). 
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costs, QL.   This element of consumer loss depends upon the slope (more 
precisely, elasticity) of the demand curve: if demand were perfectly 
inelastic (perfectly vertical in Figure 1) – meaning roughly that the good 
or service is akin to a necessity without substitutes for a certain category 
of consumers – then consumers would bear the entire liability increase.  
If demand were perfectly elastic – meaning consumers have no 
willingness to pay more than a particular price – there would be no 
increase in the prices paid by consumers, but there would still be a 
reduction in supply at that price, as only some suppliers could remain in 
business. 
Since virtually any product or service sold to consumers carries 
with it the risk of CPA liability, at least with respect to items for which 
consumer demand is in the short run inelastic, it is consumers who are 
likely to bear the bulk of the cost of CPA liability, not firms.   Especially 
for everyday goods and services – for which consumers do not shop out 
of state or online – states that have especially egregious CPA liability 
regimes are likely to be imposing most of the cost right back on the very 
same consumers whose welfare is supposed to be furthered.  Moreover, 
it is well established in the public finance literature that excise taxes tend 
to be regressive – lower income consumers pay a larger portion of their 
income in excise taxes than do higher income consumers.111   
Importantly, the cost imposition and welfare loss from this 
regressive tax (higher prices) is likely to be far out of proportion to 
whatever benefits CPA liability may generate. That is, the normal case 
for products liability – that consumers may pay more but at the same 
time are made better off from the safer products that liability induces – 
has little application to CPA liability.  While it is true that the threat of 
CPA liability will deter some actors from engaging in practices that truly 
are “unfair” or “deceptive,” liability under the substantive “unfair” or 
“deceptive” standard is so arbitrary and uncertain that any and every 
seller faces potential CPA liability, even those whose selling practices 
are actually providing valuable information to consumers.   Indeed, as 
many of the most unscrupulous sellers may be judgment proof, it is 
 
111 As explainined in The Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy ___ to ___ 
(Joseph J. Cordes, Robert D. Ebel, and Jane G. Gravelle, eds. 1999), depending upon 
the purchase decisions of consumers of differing income, excise taxes can also be 
highly regressive, tending to tax the poor more than the rich.   The tendency for private 
CPA actions to be filed against businesses that provide very basic goods and services – 
such as auto repair – and which are likely to make up a bigger share of poor consumers’ 
spending, tends to suggest that CPA liability may amount to a highly regressive excise 
tax.  
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precisely those sellers who are most stable and enduring in the 
marketplace who are most at risk from CPA liability.   
 
 (ii) The Welfare Loss When CPA Liability Chills Informative 
Advertising 
With many selling practices, it may be that CPA liability is so 
unpredictable that sellers can do nothing to avoid it, so that the excise tax 
analysis just presented gives us a fairly complete picture of the consumer 
welfare loss from CPA liability.  But when it comes to CPA liability 
triggered by product labeling and advertising, both theory and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that sellers will interpret the CPA system as sending a 
quite clear signal that the way to reduce expected CPA liability is to 
either simply not advertise or communicate about certain product 
characteristics at all, or to do so in a highly qualified and conditional 
way.  In this section, we show that such restrictions on informative 
advertising can clearly harm consumer welfare.  
To understand how consumer welfare can suffer when CPA 
liability chills sellers’ incentive to advertise and communicate with 
consumers, it is necessary to review briefly the economics of advertising. 
There are a number of different economic explanations for 
advertising.112  On one set of theories, advertising is simply directed to 
persuading consumers to buy a particular brand over others by 
influencing consumer tastes or preferences. On these theories, 
advertising usually tends  to be socially wasteful, as it is simply a zero-
sum game where  firms compete for a fixed set of consumers that ends 
up only increasing costs and creating  barriers to entry.113 Other 
economic theories explain how by conveying information to consumers, 
advertising can have the socially desirable effect of lowering consumer 
search costs and/or facilitating mutual beneficial market transactions that 
would otherwise not occur.114 Economists have furthermore recognized 
that advertising can convey information about products both directly – 
through content that provides information about product characteristics, 
 
112 For an excellent overview of the historical evolution of economic theories and 
evidence about advertising as well as a detailed exposition of the most recent 
theoretical approaches, see Kyle Bagwell, The Economic Analysis of Advertising 
(version of August, 2005). 
113 See Bagwell, supra note __ at 9-16, and for an influential analysis of the 
negative welfare consequences of such taste-altering advertising, see Avinish Dixit and 
Victor D. Norman, Advertising and Welfare, 9 Bell J. Econ. 1 (1978). 
114 The foundation for theories of advertising as information was provided by 
George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961).  
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location, function or price  – and indirectly. 
That advertising can be indirectly informative is a consequence 
of the general effect of advertising in expanding demand for the 
advertised product. When high quality firms also are efficient, with low 
marginal cost and therefore more to gain by investing in demand-
expanding costly advertising, and consumers know this, then advertising 
signals high quality.115  Another content-independent mechanism by 
which advertising can convey information to consumers is especially 
important for experience goods, where the consumer learns the actual 
quality of the good after buying and using it, and where consumers can 
be repeat buyers.  For such goods, the value of an initial sale is likely to 
be higher for high quality firms, because consumers who buy the high 
quality good will become repeat purchasers.  In such a market, high 
quality firms gain more from advertising than do low quality firms, and 
therefore high quality firms will use high advertising expenditures to 
distinguish themselves.  Advertising content per se is not important in 
such a model.116  
A final and especially important way that advertising can be 
informative is by helping match consumers with varying tastes to 
products with varying characteristics.  While such matching is not 
strictly dependent upon advertising content (it can under some 
circumstances be accomplished by targeting costly advertising only at 
particular types of consumers117), most match-type advertising has 
content that informs consumers about the product characteristics, 
function and location.  
Such models perceive a basic economic tradeoff in providing 
information about product characteristics: on the one hand, by informing 
consumers as to whether it is worth their while to incur the cost of 
searching further and buying a particular product, such advertising 
generates a sure social benefit by expanding markets and increasing the 
number of mutually beneficial transactions that occur.  On the other 
hand, as advertising content becomes very more detailed and extensive, 
when a consumer who sees such an advertisement proceeds to a store to 
 
115 This theory of how advertising may be informative, as well as the germ of 
virtually all the main theories of informative advertising, may be found in Philip 
Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 729 (1974).  For an exegesis of the 
conditions under which advertising has the indirect or signaling effect, see Bagwell, 
The Economics of Advertising, supra at 84-90.  
116 For an especially elegant demonstration of this, see Richard E. Khilstrom and 
Michael H. Riordan, Advertising as a Signal, 92 J. Pol. Econ. 427 (1984). 
117 See the discussion in Bagwell, supra note __ at 95-100. 
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buy the product she thereby reveals to the firm that she has a very strong 
preference for the product – there is a good match between her 
preferences and product characteristics – information that the firm will 
wish to use by charging a high price.  Informative advertising content 
thus has two fundamental but conflicting effects: it generates better 
consumer/product matches and bigger markets, but also reduces sales 
due to higher prices.118  Essentially, firms are faced with a dilemma: if 
they provide too fine-grained information about the product, then 
consumers know that they will have to pay a relatively high price for the 
product (as the ad has told them so much that the only consumers who 
show up to buy perceive that the product is really what they want).  If 
they provide too little and it is costly for consumers to search and shop, 
then too few consumers will show up to purchase.  The profit 
maximizing solution for the firm is to provide some information about 
product characteristics, but not such extensive or detailed information 
about product characteristics that only consumers with a very high 
willingness to pay arrive to buy the product.119  Somewhat non-
intuitively, it is when search costs are high and the firm’s profit 
maximizing price is low relative to search costs that a (monopoly) firm’s 
private interest in attracting consumers can correspond perfectly with the 
social interest if which a consumer buys if and only if trade results in 
consumer surplus that exceeds her search costs.  For lower search costs, 
the firm’s price is high relative to search costs so some consumers may 
not buy even though their value is above the cost of search.  
The crucial result in this recent economic literature on advertising 
is that both consumers and firms can benefit from mass market 
communications that convey only partial or incomplete information.  
CPAs, however, put firms in the position of either saying virtually 
everything that they can imagine about a product, or else saying 
nothing.120  For example, the dairy industry has been attacked under 
 
118 For this terminology and a summary of the advertising as matching models, see 
Bagwell, supra note __ at 95-98. 
119 This result is established by Simon P. Anderson and Regis Renault, Advertising 
Content, 96 Amer. Econ. Rev. 93 (2006). 
120 Consumers are forced to either make a less-informed choice when purchasing a 
product or engage in a protracted and costly inquiry in order to acquire information 
regarding product or service attributes such as price, quality, service, and warranties. In 
many cases, consumers require little or no information at all when contracting for the 
purchase products or services, sometimes relying on price alone to inform their 
decision.  Consumer protection statutes that require certain disclosures or present a 
threat of liability motivate sellers to devote additional time and resources toward 
providing extensive information to consumers, in order to ensure statutory compliance 
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CPAs for stating that milk products can promote weight loss while 
failing to label dairy products with warnings of the effects of lactose for 
those who are or may become lactose intolerant.121 Automobile insurers 
have similarly been sued under CPAs for failing to tell consumers that 
they were requiring automobile repair shops to use generic (non-OEM) 
auto replacement parts, this despite state regulations allowing (and even 
sometimes requiring) the use of generic parts.122  Cases such as these tell 
firms that unless they convey virtually every piece of discouraging 
information about a product that can imagined, then they face possible 
punitive liability.  In other words, CPA liability tells firms that they face 
liability unless their marketing communications disclose every 
characteristic that could possibly cause a consumer to revise downward 
her willingness to pay for the product.  Even worse, as in the examples 
just proffered, such information pertains to product characteristics – the 
unsuitability of milk for people who are lactose intolerant, the use of 
generic parts – that are very obscure, in the sense that a consumer may 
not understand precisely how the presence or absence of such a 
characteristic really impacts her likely utility from consumption. 
There is no hard evidence about how such forced negative 
disclosure affects different types of consumers.  In terms of the 
theoretically relevant distinctions, there are two possibilities. One 
possibility is that the negative disclosures have their greatest impact on 
 
or minimize their exposure to liability.  Consequently, consumers are bombarded with 
information, much of which may be confusing or simply irrelevant for the purpose of 
adequately informing their purchase decisions.  The time it takes consumers to 
effectively sift through the excess of information contributes to the total cost, in time 
and resources, dedicated to a particular transaction.  Therefore, as a result of overall 
increase in information that a seller presents due to CPAs, consumer transaction costs 
increase.  Professor Jeff Sovern has recognized that CPAs often cause transaction costs 
to increase but argues that what is needed is more regulation to prevent merchants from 
passing on these costs to consumers.   Jeff Sovern, Toward a New Model of Consumer 
Protection Statutes: The Problem of Increased Transaction Costs, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1635 (2006).   
121 Cases discussed and cited in Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 9, at 4, n. 203.  
One must wonder if any regulations can protect lactose intolerant individuals who have 
not figured out that they have a problem with milk. 
122 Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. 
App. 2001) [reversed on appeal to Illinois Supreme Court] Avery v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 835 N.E.2d 801 (Ill. 2005).  Also see insurance cases where supposed 
the life insurance illustrations were deceptive, such as In Re Great Southern Life Ins. 
Co. Sales Litig., 192 F.R.D. 212 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (where failure to disclose the 
methods behind financial projections used in a marketing tool for a “vanishing 
premium” policy was a basis for a claim) and Boswell v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 643 
So.2d 580 (Ala. 1994) (where misrepresentation that new policy provided additional 
coverage was basis for a claim). 
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the search and purchase decisions of consumers who based on the match 
information that the firm voluntarily advertises have already decided not 
to actually shop for the product.  In this case, the disclosures induced by 
the risk of punitive CPA liability would have little impact on market 
equilibria because they would merely reinforce the firm’s interest in 
deterring low value consumers from incurring search costs.  But if the 
negative disclosures that CPA liability essentially forces are most likely 
to impact the search and purchase decisions of consumers who otherwise 
would be high value, causing them perhaps incorrectly to downwardly 
revise their expected value from the product, then CPA liability will have 
seriously impacted the economic function of match advertising.  If firms 
cannot send partial information in their advertising, but must include 
bizarre negative information of unclear meaning or relevance to 
consumers or else incur potentially large liability, then firms may not 
provide any product characteristic information.  For goods with low 
search costs, the social loss will be relatively low: consumers will search 
for such goods even if they don’t know very much about whether the 
product really suits their preferences.  But for goods with higher search 
costs, the impact of CPA liability in deterring advertising may be such 
that there is too little information to justify consumers in incurring search 
costs, and markets with such high search costs may unbundle. 
 
III.  THE PROPER ROLE FOR STATE CPAS AMONG THE 
INSTITUTIONS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
 
The economic analysis of state CPAs presented in the previous 
part of this Article has shown that the current state CPA regime likely 
has seriously adverse consequences for the welfare of the very group that 
such laws are designed to help – consumers.  But showing that the 
current regime is fundamentally flawed does not by itself indicate what 
should be done to fix it. From an economic point of view, the 
prescription for fixing the state CPA mess begins by understanding the 
proper role for CPA liability within the broader institutional landscape of 
consumer protection.  In other words, the proper role for and design of 
state CPA liability cannot be determined unless one understands the role 
played by CPA liability as a supplement to other institutions of consumer 
protection.  As aptly put recently by Professor Timothy J. Muris, former 
Chairman of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, these institutions are 
interdependent: 
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One can envision the American system of consumer 
protection as a three-legged stool:  a first leg of competition 
based on free enterprise with a second leg the legal structure 
of contract, property and other private law that largely 
focuses on the relative rights of particular parties.  A two-
legged stool will not be very stable.  Likewise, markets and 
private legal rights, while indispensable to the American 
economic system, may falter in key respects.  These legs can 
better support the American economic system when 
buttressed by a third leg.  Public agencies – entrusted to 
promote consumer welfare by preserving competition and 
protecting consumers – work as this third leg, reinforcing the 
other two.123 
 
As Muris suggests, state CPA liability should be understood as 
supplementing the protection that consumers get from markets and the 
common law on the one hand and from FTC enforcement under the FTC 
Act on the other.  In this Part, we argue that there is indeed a potential 
role for state CPAs in supplementing markets, the common law, and 
FTC enforcement, and derive the proper role for state CPAs from the 
limitations of the market, common law, and FTC enforcement.  
  
A.  Market Forces for Consumer Protection – And How Private 
Litigation under State CPAs Interfere with Those Forces 
 
Even if there were no laws or regulations protecting consumers 
against false and misleading seller practices, under certain conditions, 
the market itself generates strong incentives for sellers to inform 
consumers about product quality.   Most straightforwardly, consumers 
have every incentive to become informed about not only the goods that 
they buy but about the sellers from whom they buy them, and sellers 
have strong incentives to develop and maintain a reputation for making 
truthful and informative claims about the goods and services that they 
sell.  A traditional – indeed in some sense the traditional – economic 
criticism of consumer protection regulation whether by the FTC or CPAs 
is that market forces such as reputation can have a stronger, and more 
 
123  Muris, supra note 12, at 4-5. 
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precise, disciplining effect on seller misbehavior than any lawsuit.124  
We agree with the argument that market forces for consumer protection 
are much stronger than many advocates of consumer protection laws 
tend to believe.  However, the role of the market is much more nuanced 
than some law and economics scholars seem to assume. As we now 
explain, the strength of market incentives for consumer protection 
depends upon both seller and buyer type: upon the ability of repeat 
sellers to identify their product to consumers via pricing, branding and 
advertising; upon the extent to which consumers are repeat purchasers 
and the cost and speed with which consumers obtain information about 
product quality.  As we also explain, in their current form, state CPA’s 
may actually hinder rather than assist market forces for consumer 
protection. 
 
1. The Lemons Market Problem  
 
 As an analytical benchmark, consider first the extreme case, 
where consumers are omniscient.  In this case, even without taking any 
sort of costly action, consumers have perfect information about the price 
and characteristics of every product or service.  With such free and 
perfect information, it is almost a tautology that consumers cannot be 
misled by anything that a seller might say about the product or service.  
Consumers might still be subject to monopoly pricing, but this would be 
due to lack of competition, not misleading or deceptive practices by 
manufacturers or distributors.   
 Once we move to the more realistic case – where at least some 
consumers are at best imperfectly informed about the product or service 
– imperfect information has potentially serious consequences for 
consumer welfare.  If consumers can acquire perfect information about 
all product characteristics, including price, but have a positive cost of 
search, then market prices will generally exceed the competitive level.125   
 
124 As argued recently by Omri Ben-Shahar in delivering the annual Coase Lecture 
at the University of Chicago.  See Student Blogger – The Myths of Consumer 
Protection Law, February 26, 2009, available at 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2009/02/the-myths-of-consumer-protection-
law.html#more.  See also Hadfield et al., supra note___ (arguing that in many 
consumer markets there are “well-developed reputation mechanisms permitting other 
consumers to monitor the extent to which a merchant lives up to its promises.”) 
 125  More precisely, there is a general tendency for market prices to increase to 
the monopoly level, as consumer search costs increase.  See A. Sadanand and Louis 
Wilde, A generalized model of pricing for homogeneous goods under imperfect 
  43
                                                                                                                      
With incomplete consumer information about product quality, 
market existence itself becomes an issue.  In the standard model of such 
markets, it is assumed that information is asymmetric, in that while 
sellers of goods or services know the actual quality of the goods or 
services they sell, buyers only know average quality.  Under such 
informational conditions, if high quality sellers cannot credibly identify 
themselves, so that buyers effectively think every seller’s good is of 
average quality, then buyers will not pay more than the value of average 
quality.  If high cost – high quality sellers cannot charge more than this 
average-quality price, then they cannot make a profit.   But when the 
very highest quality sellers drop out of the market, then the average 
quality falls, and now the new highest quality sellers may be losing 
money, causing them to leave the market, and so on, leading to the non-
existence of market equlibrium.  This result – that asymmetric 
information can cause markets to unravel, with low quality goods in 
effect driving out high quality goods  – is known as the lemons market 
problem (with name corresponding to the problem caused by 
automobiles that are poor quality “lemons.”)126  
 
2. Overcoming Lemons Markets through Voluntary Disclosure: 
The Unraveling Result  
 
In reality, lemons problems rarely cause markets to fail.    
Lemons markets are overcome because producers and consumers have 
strong incentives to respectively communicate and obtain credible and 
accurate information as to product quality.  Because consumers will pay 
more for a high quality good or service, a high cost/high quality seller 
generally has a very strong incentive to inform consumers about the 
quality of her product.  It has been demonstrated that when consumers 
cannot costlessly and perfectly verify ex ante the truth of seller claims 
about product quality, then they will assume that quality is the worst 
possible consistent with a particular seller disclosure.  Such consumer 
expectations in turn generate an equilibrium in which the highest quality 
 
information, 49 Rev. Econ. Stud. 229 (1982); Stephen Salop and Joseph Stiglitz, 
Bargains and Rip-offs: A Model of Monopolistically Competitive Price Dispersions, 44 
Rev. Econ. Stud. 493 (1977).  As is well known, monopoly prices exceed the social 
marginal cost of production, leading to socially suboptimal levels of consumption and a 
distortion in the allocation of capital. 
 
126  George A. Ackerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970). 
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seller type perfectly and exactly reveals quality, causing the next highest 
quality seller to also perfectly reveal quality, and so on, in a process 
where seller private information completely unravels and rational 
consumers are fully and completely informed about product quality.127  
Such voluntary disclosure eliminates the lemons market problem, 
because since good sellers can easily distinguish themselves from bad 
sellers just by making truthful and fully informative disclosures, good 
sellers will enter the market and effectively drive out the lowest quality 
sellers.128   
The world posited by the unraveling result is one in which 
consumers are perfectly rational (in that they fully understand the 
relevant incentives and can deduce market equilibria) and can perfectly 
and costlessly verify seller statements about product quality.  In such a 
world, the question is not whether sellers will lie about product quality – 
they cannot, by assumption – but how much they will reveal about 
product quality.129 The unraveling result is that in such a world, rather 
than issuing vague statements about product quality – such as “fish 
weighing at least ten and as much as twenty pounds” – sellers will issue 
precise statements about product quality – such as “fish weighing 11.2 
pounds.”   
The assumptions underlying the unraveling result are severe, and 
although some assumptions turn out not to be crucial to the result of full 
quality disclosure (e.g., the result holds under monopolistic as well as 
competitive product markets)130 others are required.131 In particular, 
 
127 This is known as the “unraveling” result on quality disclosure, and was 
developed independently by Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of 
Warranties and Private Disclosure About Product Quality, 24 J. Law & Econ. 461 
(1981) and Paul R. Milgrom, Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and 
Applications, 12 Bell J. Econ. 380 (1981). The result is explicated and its limitations 
discussed in Joseph Farrell, Voluntary Disclosure: Robustness of the Unraveling Result, 
and Comments on Its Importance, in Antitrust and Regulation 91 (Robert E. Grieson, 
ed., 1986). 
128 See J. Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information, 
24 J.L. & Econ. 291, 502 (1981). 
129 An observation made by Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties, 
supra note __ at 462. 
130 See Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties, supra note __. 
131 If, for example, disclosure itself is costly, then sellers disclose if any only if 
quality is above some threshold level.Boyan Jovanovic, Truthful Disclosure of 
Information, 13 Bell J. Econ. 36 (1982). SIMILARLY, IF IT IS costly for sellers to 
become informed about their product quality, then sellers become informed only if the 
cost of doing so is low, and disclose only if the information that they learn is favorable. 
See, for example, Farrell, Voluntary Disclosure, supra note __ and Steven Shavell, 
Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale, 25 Rand J. Econ. 20 (1994).  
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when a sufficiently large number of consumers cannot understand the 
disclosure – because it contains somewhat technical data regarding the 
product, for example – then voluntary disclosure of quality may not 
occur.132 As we argued earlier, the very expansive and uncertain 
construction of what might constitute an “unfair” or “deceptive” practice 
under state CPA laws actually creates an incentive for sellers to make 
precisely the kind of long and technically detailed disclosures – precisely 
the kind that many consumers cannot understand, and which may destroy 
the possibility of avoiding lemons market problems through voluntary 
disclosure.  This is, indeed, an extraordinarily perverse result – private 
litigation under state CPAs (by reducing voluntary disclosure) may 
trigger calls for mandatory disclosure.  
 
3. Consumer Search and Product Use, and Seller Reputation 
 
As explained below, when we cannot rely on voluntary disclosure 
because seller claims about product quality cannot be costly and 
perfectly verified by consumers, the common law of contract, and fraud, 
become important supplements, and adjuncts, to market incentives for 
product quality disclosure.  But of  course consumers need not rely 
solely on seller statements for information about product quality.   
Consumers may learn about product quality by searching for and 
observing products (trying on a coat, for example) before purchase, or 
after they purchase and use the good (buying and then using a 
television).  Consumer search, observation and product use are all very 
important market mechanisms that not only restore equilibrium in 
markets with imperfectly informed consumers but also discipline 
deceptive selling practices.  
In the economics literature, goods whose quality the consumer 
can identify by simply examining the good are known as search goods, 
while goods whose quality can be determined by consumers only after 
purchasing and using the good are known as experience goods.133 With 
 
132 Michael J. Fishman and Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory versus Voluntary 
Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J. Law, Econ. & 
Org. 45 (2003).  Additionally, when firms sell differentiated, multi-attribute products to 
consumers with varying preferences over those attributes, firms may not voluntarily 
disclose because disclosure may increase the price elasticity of demand with respect to 
some products. V. Joseph Hotz and Mo Xiao, Strategic Information Disclosure: The 
Case of Multi-Attribute Products with Heterogeneous Consumers, NBER Working 
Paper No.  W11937, January, 2006. 
133 See, e.g., A. M.  Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Quarterly Journal of 
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search goods, consumers can learn about quality, and reward high quality 
providers with higher prices, if the cost of searching and observing 
quality is sufficiently low that they will continue to search – moving on 
to another store – if they observe unexpectedly low quality.134 Indeed, 
with search goods, high prices may themselves signal high quality, since 
provided that search costs are not too high, consumers will always 
continue to shop if they observe low quality but high prices at a 
particular seller.135  
 With experience goods, it is generally much more costly for the 
consumer to actually judge quality, since judging quality requires buying 
and using the product for some time period.  For durable goods, 
moreover, the required period of use may be quite long.136 With 
experience goods, the power of the market as a force disciplining low 
quality sellers depends crucially on how long it takes consumers to 
actually learn the quality of the good or service through consumption.  
As one would expect, therefore, existing empirical evidence shows that 
consumer experience good learning varies with the type of good.  For 
some goods, such as laundry detergent, it seems that consumers already 
 
Economics 355 (1974); and A.M. Spence, Competitive and Optimal Responses to 
Signals, 7 Journal of Economic Theory 296 (1974). 
134 This result also establishes the existence of markets in heterogeneous search 
goods (so that the lemons market nonexistence problem is overcome).  See Birger 
Wernerfelt, Selling Formats for Search Goods, 13 Marketing. Sci. 298 (1994).  Alan 
Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Competitive Equilibria in Markets for Heterogeneous 
Goods under Imperfect Information: A Theoretical Analysis with Policy Implications, 
13 Bell J. Econ. 181 (1982),   
135 For this result, see Paul W.J. De Bijl, Entry deterrence and signaling in markets 
for search goods, 16 Intl. J. Indus. Org. 1 (1997).  More generally, when some 
consumers are informed about product quality and some are not, high and declining 
prices may be a credible signal of high quality.  The reason is that the loss of sales 
volume caused by high prices is relatively less costly to high cost – high quality sellers, 
and the loss of sales volume is in any case greater for low quality sellers, who lose more 
sales from informed consumers.  See Kyle Bagwell and Michael H.  Riordan, High and 
Declining Prices Signal Product Quality, 81 Amer. Econ. Rev. 224 (1991). 
136 For this reason, the composition of the consumer pool for an experience good 
changes over time following the introduction of a new good, and sales generate not 
only revenue for sellers, but also an increasingly large number of informed consumers.   
In light of these two effects, economists have shown that pricing for experience goods 
is generally dynamic, with prices sometimes starting high and then falling (with so-
called mass market goods, where most consumers are quite sure even before 
consumption that they value the good highly), and sometimes starting low and then 
rising (for so-called niche goods, where consumers are not as optimistic about the value 
of the good ex ante). For this result, and a very clear summary of the theoretical 
literature on experience good pricing with imperfectly informed consumers, see Dirk 
Bergemant and Juulo Välimäki, Dynamic Pricing of New Experience Goods, 114 J. 
Pol. Econ. 713 (2006). 
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know everything at the time of purchase (such goods are actually search 
goods).137 For other goods and services – yogurt and (some) 
pharmaceuticals, and auto vehicle inspections –  empirical evidence 
shows that consumers learn quickly about product quality and quickly 
adjust their purchases according to what they learn.138 For a final 
category of goods – automobile insurance – it seems that the 
opportunities for consumer experience learning are too infrequent, and 
switching costs perhaps too high, for experiential learning to have much 
of an impact on consumer buying behavior.139  
Thus for experience goods – a large and important category that 
includes many or perhaps most consumer durable goods – the ability of 
consumers to learn about quality and then base their future purchase 
choices on such information is likely to vary systematically with the type 
of good, and in particular with the speed at which consumers learn 
information about quality and the cost to them of switching purchases.  
In other words, the ability of repeat customers to punish sellers who have 
deceived them by simply taking their business elsewhere is indeed a 
market force favoring high quality experience goods and deterring 
deceptive claims about such goods, but its strength is not likely to be the 
same for all kinds of experience goods.140   
From the point of view of sellers, for either search or experience 
goods (or services) sellers of high quality goods have an incentive to 
identify themselves to repeat purchasers through brand name and 
trademarks so as to earn, and keep their business.  Sellers who sell low 
quality merchandise may enjoy some short term profits by charging 
relatively high prices for low-cost and low quality goods, but in the 
longer term, the ability of consumers to discern product quality through 
use, and to identify and reward sellers of high quality products, can make 
it economically rational for sellers to invest in producing high cost, high 
 
137 Tulin Erdem and Michael P. Keane, Decision-Making under Uncertainty: 
Capturing Dynamic Brand Choice Processes in Turbulent Consumer Goods Markets, 
15 Marketing Sci. 1 (1996). 
138 See Daniel A. Ackberg, Advertising, Learning, and Consumer Choice in 
Experience Good Markets: An Empirical Examination, 44 Intl. Econ. Rev. 1007 
(2003); Gregory S. Crawford and Matthew Shum, Uncertainty and Learning in 
Pharmaceutical Demand, 73 Econometrica 1137 (2005); Thomas N. Hubbard, How Do 
Consumers Motivate Experts? Reputational Incentives in an Auto Repair Market, 45 J. 
Law & Econ. 437 (2002). 
139 Mark Israel, Services as Experience Goods: An Empirical Examination of 
Consumer Learning in Automobile Insurance, 95 Amer. Econ. Rev. 1444 (2005). 
140 See.,e.g., Lester G. Telser, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 
27 (1980). 
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quality products.141  
Strictly speaking, however, the withdrawal of possible repeat 
business is not always sufficient for such reputational sanctions to 
effectively drive out cheating or disreputable sellers.  Reputation can 
provide a perfect discipline against low quality or deceptive sellers only 
if all future buyers (including those who do not have first-hand 
experience) have knowledge of a seller’s failure to deliver on its promise 
of high quality.142  Some such general reputational information is 
provided by the increasingly important word-of-mouth communication 
conduit.  But consumer demand for information about past seller 
performance elicits more than queries of other consumers.  To satisfy 
this demand for information, the market itself, through sources such as 
“Consumer Reports” and “Angie’s List,” provides information about 
sellers to consumers.  Such profit-driven information intermediaries 
provide the information about product quality that is necessary for 
market reputation to discipline and restore equilibrium in consumer 
markets for experience goods.143 
 Such intermediaries are an even more important market response 
to imperfect consumer information with another category of goods and 
services called “credence goods.” Credence goods are goods for which 
quality cannot be determined by the consumer even after consuming the 
product.144 For example, even repeat purchases and consumption cannot 
determine the accuracy of a seller’s claim that their dark chocolate 
reduces one’s chance of cardiovascular problems.  As this example 
indicates, for many credence goods and services, expert providers often 
know more about the quality of good that a consumer needs than does 
the consumer, and because of this extreme form of information 
 
141  See generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces 
in Assuring Contractual Performan, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 615 (1981).  
142 As explained by W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships and Contract 
Enforcement, 65 J. Econ. Lit. 595, 614 (2007). 
143 For examples of other intermediaries, see MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships 
and Contract Enforcement, supra note __ at 614. 
144  See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal Amount 
of Fraud, 16 J. L. & Econ. 67, 68-69 (1973)(“Credence goods are those which, although 
worthwhile, cannot be evaluated with normal use.  Instead the assessment of their value 
requires additional costly information.  An example would be the claimed advantages 
of the removal of an appendix, which will be correct or not according to whether the 
organ is diseased.  The purchaser will have not different experience after the operation 
whether or not the organ was diseased.  A similar example would apply to replacement 
of a television tube, certain automobile repairs and the like.  The line between 
experience and credence qualities of a good may not always be sharp, particularly if 
they will be discerned in use, but only after the lapse of a considerable period of time.”) 
  49
                                                
asymmetry, it is possible for disreputable providers to charge the 
consumer for goods or services never provided, or providing the wrong 
quantity or type of goods or services to the consumer (under under- or 
over-providing).145 Credence goods are like experience goods for which 
the consumers’ experience provides no information to the consumer 
about the quality of the good or service or the truth of the seller’s 
statements about her needs, unless first analyzed and interpreted by a 
third party expert.  Indeed, because the consumer can be perfectly 
satisfied with the observed outcome and yet have received the wrong 
good or service or been mislead as to the good or service, direct 
consumer sanctions – such as failing to buy again from or bad-mouthing 
a particular seller – are inherently limited in the case of credence 
goods.146  
For this reason, it is perhaps unsurprising that the market alone 
suffices to discipline credence good suppliers if and only if a number of 
very restrictive conditions are met.147  Still, while it is in general more 
difficult for third parties to evaluate and provide information to 
consumers about the quality of credence goods and services than to 
evaluate and provide information about experience goods and services, it 
is not impossible.  In the medical service area, for example, a number of 
states have recently begun to provide co-called “medical report cards” 
that give consumers accessible information about crucial medical 
outcomes (such as mortality rates) at different hospitals.  While it is 
unclear whether such report cards are having their impact on patients – 
who choose to stay away from hospitals with bad report cards – or 
hospitals – who either terminate poor-performing physicians or 
encourage them to alter their practice patterns – there is evidence that 
such reports have significantly improved outcomes at the low quality 
hospitals in particular. 148  
 
145 This description of credence goods is from Uwe Dulleck and Rudolf 
Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer Specialists: The Economics of 
Credence Goods, 64 J. Econ. Lit. 5, 5-6 (2006).  
146 See Dulleck and Kerschbamer, On Doctors, Mechanics, and Computer 
Specialists, supra note __ at 11. 
147 Including observability or verifiability, neither of which is likely to hold in the 
typical credence goods situation.  See Dulleck and Kerschbamer, On Doctors, 
Mechanics and Computer Specialists, supra note __ at 12-17. 
148 See David M. Cutler et. Al., The Role Of Information In Medical Markets: An 
Analysis Of Publicly Reported Outcomes In Cardiac Surgery, 94 Amer. Econ. Rev. 342  
(2004), who studied the impact of the oldest medical report card system in the U.S., the 
Cardiac Surgery Reporting System (CSRS) in New York State. Using data on the 
distribution of risk-adjusted mortality rates across hospitals over the period 1991-1999, 
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In concluding this discussion of experience and credence goods, 
it is important to emphasize the very real welfare consequences of 
consumer deception.  The weaker the ability of consumers to verify 
quality through experience or outside certifiers, and the less informative 
is seller reputation, the greater the probability that a consumer will buy a 
poor or deceptively low quality good.  Prices will send the wrong signals 
for the allocation of productive effort and capital, and because they will 
sometimes pay more than a product is worth to them, consumers will be 
hesitant to buy at all.   While not as extreme as the lemons market non-
existence result, the practical consequence of consumer deception is to 
shrink the market in a socially undesirable way. 149 
 
4. State CPA Laws as Currently Construed Hinder Rather than 
Support Market Forces that Discipline Seller Deceptive Practices 
 
The primary mechanism underlying market forces for consumer 
protection is accurate and verifiable information.  However they obtain it 
-- whether through search, product use, or third party evaluators – it is 
such information that allows consumers to discipline sellers who engage 
in deceptive practices by taking their business elsewhere, and to reward 
with their continuing business sellers who establish a reputation for 
honesty and quality.  From the point of view of supporting these positive 
market forces, the key question about the current CPA regime is whether 
or not the signal sent by CPA liability adds to the amount of useful 
information possessed by market participants, or instead detracts from it.  
Our earlier analysis of both the CPA process and the substantive 
standard for CPA liability strongly suggests that the current CPA regime 
may significantly blur the information that consumers have about 
producers, thus hindering rather than supporting market forces.      
 The primary defect of the CPA regime as currently configured is 
that it creates incentives for class action attorneys to bring suits in order 
to obtain settlements from defendants whose conduct was almost surely 
neither deceptive nor misleading in any meaningful way. 
 
Cutler et. Al. found evidence indicating that the system especially improved the 
performance of low-quality hospitals.  Hospitals labeled as high mortality initially 
decreased bypass surgery volume by about 10 percent (for an average-sized hospital), 
with the decrease almost entirely among the healthiest patients (who presumably did 
not need the surgery at all in many cases).   
149 For an excellent survey of the various ways consumers may become informed 
and the consequence of imperfect information, see Joseph Stiglitz, The Causes and 
Consequences of the Dependence of Quality on Price, 25 J. Econ. Lit. 1 (1987). 
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Announcements of settlements of claims that are actually meritless may 
convey false information to consumers. More importantly, for sellers 
who are selling precisely the goods that they claim to be – honest sellers 
– the prospect of being sued and ending up paying potentially large class 
actions settlements lowers the return from such honest behavior relative 
to the return from opportunistic behavior.  To be blunt, if a seller is going 
to be sued under a state CPA and made to pay roughly the same amount 
regardless of whether or not she has tried to increase her sales and profits 
by deceiving consumers, then why would she rationally give up the extra 
profits obtainable through deception?  By both confusing consumers and 
confronting honest sellers with a risk of CPA liability, the current CPA 
significantly interferes with market mechanisms for consumer protection. 
 
B.  The Common Law and its Limitations as a Supplement to 
Market Forces for Consumer Protection 
 
As we have seen, market sanctions against low quality or 
deceptive sellers are not perfect, and are dependent upon the speed and 
accuracy with which consumers observe actual product quality and with 
which product quality information is transmitted to other market 
participants. However, by enforcing promises to provide goods of a 
particular quality – warranties – and by penalizing false and misleading 
seller communications about product quality as fraudulent, the common 
law of contract itself may significantly enhance market incentives for 
consumer protection.  
 
1. The Power of Contractual Commitment 
 
Through the simple but powerful device of making contractual 
promises of quality – warranties – legally enforceable, the common law 
can greatly strengthen market forces for consumer protection.   To see 
this, consider the case of an experience good where buyers and sellers 
are not repeat players.  As explained earlier, in this case, voluntary 
disclosure of product quality will not occur when consumers cannot 
perfectly and costlessly verify the truth of the disclosure.  However, 
because the good is, by assumption, an experience good, consumers do 
learn the quality of the product through use.  Provided that warranties of 
quality – promises of quality, that is – are legally enforceable, high 
quality–high cost sellers can distinguish themselves to consumers by 
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making such warranties.   Here, legally enforceable means that quality 
failures are not only observable by consumers but also verifiable to 
courts.  When quality is both ex post observable and ex post verifiable, 
any given warranty is less costly to a high-quality seller, then it can be 
shown that under both monopolistic and competitive product markets, 
sellers of high quality goods perfectly distinguish themselves by offering 
complete or full warranties. 150   
Warranties are by no means the only contractual mechanism by 
which high quality sellers attempt to distinguish themselves from low 
quality sellers.  Liberal product return policies, such as promises to take 
products back and then repair or replace defective products at no cost to 
the consumer, are generally costlier to low quality sellers than to high 
quality sellers. Hence such return policies can also allow high quality 
sellers to distinguish themselves from low quality sellers.151   
 
2.  Common Law Fraud and Information Disclosure 
 
An equally important common law doctrine protecting consumers 
is fraud.  Economic models that predict full voluntary disclosure of 
product quality in fact hinge upon the assumption that false statements 
about product quality are not made because of certain detection and high 
penalties for such statements.152  Another way to put the “unraveling 
result” discussed earlier is indeed that if false seller statements are 
precluded either by perfect consumer knowledge or by effective 
penalties, then sellers will not only disclose truthful product quality 
information, but will be induced by market competition to fully and 
precisely disclose product quality. 
 In practical terms, the way in which such market disclosure 
works is elegantly simple.  Simply by asking sellers to describe the 
various attributes of the good for sale, consumers elicit either vague 
answers – at the extreme, the answer of “we don’t know, it could be 
 
150 See Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties, supra note __ at 470-477. 
151 See Wernerfelt, Selling Strategies for Search Goods, supra note __. 
152 See, for example, Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private 
Disclosure, supra note __.  See also See., e.g., Paul H. Rubin, Regulating Deception, 10 
Cato J. 667, 679 (1991)(“There is much support in the recent literature for the 
proposition that, as long as deception is not allowed, there are incentives for sellers to 
disclose even the negative attributes of their products.  This is because consumers will 
rationally assume that any advertisement which omits a critical piece of information 
(say, the durability of a product) will imply that the value of that attribute is the lowest 
level.”) 
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anything” – or precise answers.  A perfect fraud rule confronts sellers 
with certain large penalties if they make a false precise statement.   
Hence with such a fraud rule in place, sellers either make an accurate 
precise statement about product quality, or a vague statement.  But this is 
precisely the set of options that generates the unraveling result: high 
quality sellers precisely reveal product quality, and consumers rationally 
infer the lowest quality consistent with a vague seller disclosure, causing 
all sellers to precisely reveal product quality. Thus if consumers know 
that the common law fraud doctrine prevents sellers from lying to them 
about product quality, then consumers themselves can elicit full 
disclosure even about multi-attribute items simply by asking sellers to 
describe the various attributes of the goods for sale.  
 
3. Limitations to Common Law, Market-Based Consumer 
Protection  
 
Inasmuch as the effectiveness of market incentives for consumer 
protection depends upon the common law enforcement of warranties and 
the prohibition of fraud, weaknesses and imperfections in the common 
law weaken market incentives for consumer protection.   If promises 
were perfectly and costlessly interpreted and enforced by courts, then a 
seller would incur liability for breaching a warranty of quality whenever, 
but only when, it actually breached the warranty.  But courts are not 
perfect.  Sometimes a seller might be held liable for breach of warranty 
even though the product fully lived up to its promised quality.  
Sometimes a warranty might be breached, and yet the consumer would 
either be unable to discern the breach or find the cost of suit too high to 
merit filing a lawsuit.  Even if a consumer sues, courts may mistakenly 
find no breach of warranty despite the provision of lower quality than 
promised.   
The various costs and errors of common law litigation mean that 
legally enforceable promises can be exploited by opportunistic sellers 
and consumers.  An opportunistic seller can provide a warranty without 
any intention of honoring the warranty should the product fail.  To the 
extent that some buyers will rely on the warranty, those consumers are 
harmed.  Moreover, such a phantom warranty can cause a competitive 
imbalance by giving an advantage (perhaps only temporary) to the 
dishonest sellers.  In the extreme, a lemons market can develop.153  
 
153 Of course, legitimate sellers also have an interest in removing honest sellers 
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Conversely, opportunistic consumers might well take advantage of 
liberal and legally enforceable return policies to use and then return non-
defective durable goods, essentially obtaining a free rental.  Similarly, 
opportunistic consumers might claim breach of warranty for quality 
defects due not to anything that the seller did, but to the consumer’s own 
mis- or overuse of the product.  Such consumer opportunism causes 
sellers to limit the range of legally enforceable promises that they make 
to consumers, making it more difficult for high quality, reputable sellers 
to signal their type to consumers, and ultimately hurting honest but 
imperfectly informed consumers.154  
 The primary “consumer law” provisions of the common law – 
actions for fraudulent misrepresentation or negligent misrepresentation – 
are similarly far from the ideal market support mechanisms.155 A 
common law action for fraudulent misrepresentation generally required 
the plaintiff to show that the defendant intentionally and knowingly 
deceived the plaintiff regarding a material fact and that the plaintiff 
justifiably relied on the misstatement which caused the plaintiff’s 
financial loss.156  It was difficult for consumers to prove these elements. 
Even when a plaintiff could prove all of the elements, common law 
actions were viable only when the plaintiff’s damages were large enough 
to justify the cost of suing, something that was not often the case in 
typical consumer fraud actions.157   
 The common law of fraudulent misrepresentation was gradually 
supplemented by negligent misrepresentation which allowed recourse 
even when the defendant did not knowingly misrepresent a material fact 
 
from the market.  They often achieve this through enactment of special interest 
legislation limiting entry into the market. 
154 The equilibrium result is the use by sellers of standard-form consumer contracts 
that give sellers the discretion, but do not legally obligate them, to provide additional 
produce and service quality benefits to consumers.  See Jason Scott Johnston, The 
Return of Bargain: An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable 
Cooperative Negotiation between Businesses and Consumers, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 857 
(2006); Lucian A. Bebchuck and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in 
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 827 (2006). 
155 Michael M. Greenfield, Consumer Law: A Guide for Those Who Represent 
Sellers, Lenders, and Consumers 173 (1995). 
156 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525 (1977). 
157 Victor E. Schwartz and Cary Silverman, Common Sense Construction of 
Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005).  See also See Jonathan A. 
Mark, Dispensing with the Public Interest Requirement in Private Causes of Action 
Under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, 29 Seattle U. L. Rev. 205, 207-210; 
and Donna S. Shapiro, The Georgia Fair Business Practices Act: Business as Usual, 9 
Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 453, 483 (1993). 
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but did so because of lack of reasonable care in ascertaining the truth.158 
Specifically, a plaintiff had to show that the defendant made a false 
statement because of lack of reasonable care in determining the facts or 
in the manner of expression or an absence of skill or competence 
expected in a given industry or profession.159 The plaintiff also had to 
show that it was reasonable to rely on the defendant’s statement and the 
statement caused the plaintiff’s injury.160 These last few requirements 
gave plaintiffs the same problems that abounded with fraudulent 
misrepresentation, mainly that the common law had no form of recourse 
to punish the defendant before the plaintiff went through with the 
transaction and that the cost of bringing the suit far outweighed the 
actual damages.  Contract law was equally unhelpful because businesses 
were often able to make false claims in their advertising materials 
without actually entering into a contract.161   
 
4. The Common Law’s Shortcomings: A Role for Federal and 
State Consumer Protection  
 
 Thus, as a general matter, the effectiveness of the common law as 
a mechanism enabling market incentives for quality is limited by two 
factors:  
i) Imperfect Determination of Liability: the general imperfection 
the common law process in determining whether warranties and similar 
promises have been breached and in determining whether a false 
statement had been knowingly or negligently made; 
ii) Disproportionate Costs of Liability Determination: the 
tendency for individual costs of bringing suit to be greater than the loss 
from seller deception about product quality. 
These analytical conclusions tell us what a consumer protection 
regulatory system (whether federal or state) would look like if, as its 
proponents originally intended, it were truly designed to supplement the 
shortcomings in the consumer protections provided by a market system 
subject only to the common law.162  Such a system would indeed need to 
 
158 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 26 (1981). 
162 See Muris, supra note __,  at 14 (“Consumer protection policy also has a vital 
role in supporting markets.  It helps ensure that consumers can make well-informed 
decisions about their choices and that sellers will fulfill their promises and not increase 
sales by lying about their products.  Thus, prevention of deception helps consumers in 
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locate a procedural device for overcoming the lack of viability of 
individual suits.  The class action is such a device.  But it would not need 
to supplement the class action with statutory, enhanced or punitive 
damages.  And most importantly, it would need to send a signal that is 
very clear ex ante as to precisely what kinds of seller conduct and seller 
communications run afoul of the statutory standard.  As we have argued, 
the current CPA regime of private enforcement does not do this.    
 
C.  Regulation: Market Monitoring and Intervention by the Federal 
Trade Commission 
 
As described earlier, in supplementing market and common law 
forces for consumer protection, CPAs do not stand alone, but against the 
background provided by FTC regulation. Such regulation is indeed the 
traditional (and sometimes economically recommended) response to a 
perceived inadequacy of markets and the common law.163  On the view 
that the purpose of state CPAs are to supplement optimally the gaps in 
deterrence already achieved by the market and the common law, as well 
as federal enforcement, the logical question to ask is whether and how 
the FTC regulatory regime needs to be supplemented at all.  
 
1. Key Aspects of the FTC Enforcement Regime 
 
Perhaps the most direct, market-oriented regulatory strategy to 
 
two ways: first, most obviously, by deterring deceptive sellers; and second by making it 
easier for honest sellers to make credible claims about their products.”). 
163 In addition to state and federal consumer protection law, the federal antitrust 
laws, embodied in the Sherman Act and Clayton Act, provide another constraint on 
business activities.  While consumer protection law is aimed at protecting consumers 
directly, antitrust law governs the interaction between competitors in the marketplace.  
Specifically, antitrust law controls the supply side of the market, by proscribing 
collusive and exclusionary tactics among competitors or unilateral action by a firm 
aimed at curbing competition.  Consumer protection, on the other hand, regulates the 
market on the demand side, ensuring that consumers make well-informed decisions and 
that sellers provide accurate and reliable information.  Nonetheless, consumer 
protection and federal antitrust law complement one another, by serving the common 
purpose of improving consumer welfare.  There is, however, an overlap between these 
two means of market regulation.  Whereas, consumer protection law directly governs 
transactions between buyers and sellers, it indirectly governs competition between 
sellers.  For example, when a seller uses deceptive methods in order to generate sales, 
those sales come at the expense of lost sales to honest sellers.  Furthermore, unfair and 
deceptive business practices of one or a handful of sellers may spread ill will 
throughout an entire industry, impacting all competitors in the industry by reducing the 
primary demand in general for a certain product or service.  
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protect consumers from exploitation due to incomplete, asymmetric 
information is for the government to simply require sellers to disclose 
certain information to consumers.  This has been the predominant 
approach of federal securities regulation since its inception in 1933, and 
other federal agencies adopt a similar strategy for at least part of their 
regulatory function (e.g., Consumer Product Safety Commission, Food 
and Drug Administration, and Occupational Health and Safety 
Administration). Another regulatory strategy is for government 
regulators to promote competition through antitrust policy on the belief 
that “robust competition in a strong market is the primary bulwark of 
consumer protection.”164   
Congress expanded and clarified the FTC’s consumer protection 
function in 1938 when it amended the FTC Act to grant the Commission 
the power to regulate all “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in 
commerce”165 regardless of whether the act affected competition 
between businesses166 or merely the communication between a business 
and consumer.167  The Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938 left the task of 
determining what constituted “unfair or deceptive” to the Commission.  
It has been suggested that the difficulty in pinning down a definition of 
“unfair or deceptive” and the evolving nature of the terms explains why 
Congress delegated that duty to a bi-partisan expert commission and 
empowered it with the tools to stop unfair and deceptive trade 
practices.168  Those definitions continue to develop through agency 
guides, FTC rulemaking and through administrative adjudication and 
 
164  Muris, supra note __, at 3. 
165 Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-447, § 3, 52 Stat. 111, 111 (1938) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006)).   
166 The Federal Trade Commission was originally created to prevent monopolistic 
activity within the business community.  See Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. 
No. 62-203, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000)) 
(establishing the FTC).  Specifically, Congress charged the FTC with preventing 
“[u]nfair methods of competition.”  § 5, 38 Stat. at 719.  Later, when the FTC attempted 
to regulate product advertising, the Supreme Court held that Congress only granted the 
FTC authority to regulate anti-competitive activity and therefore the agency could not 
regulate things such as deceptive advertising aimed at consumers.  See FTC v. Raladam 
Co., 283 U.S. 643, 654 (1931) (holding that the FTC had no authority to regulate an 
advertisement promoting a supposedly ineffective weight loss product where only 
consumers were harmed). 
167 Unfair consumer practices are clearly a subset of unfair competition as a 
business engaged in unfair consumer practices is trying to attract customers away from 
a competitor.  See generally Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Acts or 
Practices” in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 Geo. L. J. 225 (1981-
82). 
168 Schwartz & Silverman, supra, note 9, at 11. 
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case law.169   
 The current FTC definition of an unfair act is one that “causes or 
is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.”170  As applied, the 
definition of unfairness is determined by a comparison of benefits and 
costs of the action.171  The definition of a deceptive act currently 
involves the examination of a series of factors: “First, there must be a 
representation, omission or practice that is likely to mislead the 
consumer. . . . Second, we examine the practice from the perspective of a 
consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances. . . . Third, the 
representation, omission, or practice must be a ‘material’ one.”172  Under 
contemporary regulatory practice, the FTC decides whether an 
advertisement is false or misleading by looking at the “percentage of 
consumers who interpret the ad as making a given claim, often relying 
on empirical tests…that involve showing the disputed ad to a 
representative sample of consumers.”173  As explained by Richard 
Craswell, framing the question this way has allowed the FTC (and 
federal courts) to look and apply a “sliding scale, in which the number of 
consumers affected and the seriousness of their potential losses are both 
taken into account.”174 Under this approach, the greater the importance 
of the product attribute advertised – and the injury that would therefore 
be done if consumers were mislead about it – the smaller the threshold 
proportion of consumers that are mislead about it for the FTC to deem 
the ad misleading.175  
 
169 The law authorizes the FTC to circulate general rules, as well as rules declaring 
certain practices to be “unfair or deceptive” when it thinks they have become prevalent. 
15 U.S.C. § 57a (2000). The FTC also issues informal guides but they do not have the 
same weight as official Commission rules. 
170 See Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 2006, Pub. L. 109-455, § 3, 
120 Stat. 3372 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (n)).  For a description of the evolution of 
FTC  
171  See J. Howard Beales III, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority, Its Rise, 
Fall, and Resurrection (May 30, 2003), 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/beales/unfair0603.shtm. 
172 Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, to Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman 
of House Comm’n on Energy & Commerce, FTC Policy Statement on Deception (Oct. 
14, 1983), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-decept.htm. 
173 Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and 
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 Va. L. Rev. 565, 596 (2006). 
174 Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note __,  92 Va. L. Rev. 565, 
597.  
175 Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note __,  92 Va. L. Rev. 565, 
596.  
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 As further observed by Professor Craswell, even though the FTC 
has not often explicitly recognized that its decisions about whether or not 
a seller communication is deceptive are based on such a cost-benefit 
calculus, “a good deal” of cost-benefit analysis in fact underlies such 
decisions.176 Thus even though the FTC does not need to show that the 
defendant intended to deceive, that anyone was injured, or that the 
defendant even made a false statement,177 its practice has increasingly 
bee guided by a consumer welfare standard,  and the agency eschews 
bringing actions where technical or inconsequential violations have not 
resulted in meaningful harm to consumers. 
 Another feature of the FTC enforcement regime that 
distinguishes it from the state CPA regime is the enforcement process 
and remedy.  Very often, the FTC issues an administrative complaint, 
and such complaints have over the years generated hundreds of decisions 
by FTC administrative law judges and thousands of consent 
agreements.178 In addition to the administrative law process, the FTC 
now “frequently” uses the additional enforcement authority given to it in 
1975 to go directly into federal court, where the remedy is usually a 
cease and desist order, injunction or settlement.179  
 
 2. State CPAs Fail to Optimally Compliment FTC Enforcement 
 
 The economically justified role for state CPAs in complimenting 
FTC enforcement depends upon why it is that one believes that FTC 
enforcement is insufficient.  One possibility is that the FTC is doing 
precisely what it should be doing, on economic grounds, but is subject to 
inevitable enforcement shortfalls due to its limited budget.  The other 
possibility is that the FTC enforcement is inadequate because the FTC is 
subject to political influences. 
 Suppose first that the FTC is doing precisely what it should be 
doing on economic grounds.  We call this the faithful agent model. This 
is not a fanciful case: in our view, the FTC’s cost-benefit approach to 
 
176 Craswell, Taking Information Seriously, supra note __,  92 Va. L. Rev. 565, 
601.  
177 Jon Mize, Fencing off the Path of Least Resistance: Re-examining the role of 
Little FTC Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 Tenn. L. Rev. 653, 657-658 
(2005). 
178 Carolyn A. Carter and Jonathan Sheldon, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and 
Practices 184-185 (7th ed. 2008). 
179 Carter and Sheldon, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices, supra note __ at 
185.  
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determining whether a selling practice or advertisement is false or 
misleading is based on sound economic principles.  In other words, on 
the faithful agent view, the FTC is doing what it says it tries to do – 
focus its law enforcement resources on practices that cause the greatest 
consumer harm – and so has the economically correct enforcement 
target.  Like every regulatory agency, however, the FTC’s budget is 
limited and it must therefore prioritize cases on its enforcement agenda.  
Undoubtedly, some false or deceptive consumer practices escape FTC 
enforcement simply because of the agency’s budget constraint.  There is 
no way to know for sure how often truly deceptive practices escape FTC 
enforcement, but we can be sure that the probability that the FTC detects 
and takes remedial action against any given deceptive practice is in 
general less than one.  If the FTC is behaving as a faithful agent, then it 
also seems plausible that the more widespread and serious the harm from 
a deceptive practice, the more likely it is that the FTC will take action to 
stop it, and the sooner that such action will be taken.   Companies that 
are marketing and selling well known products and services on the 
national market would, we expect, be squarely and continuously on the 
radar screen of the FTC as faithful agent.  On the other hand, firms that 
sell in more limited markets, for shorter time periods, may escape FTC 
detection and enforcement. 
 On this faithful agent story, the basic problem with FTC 
enforcement against false and deceptive consumer practices is that the 
expected sanction in a system that relies solely on such FTC enforcement 
is likely to be too low to optimally deter such practices.  The expected 
sanction from FTC enforcement is too low because: a) the remedy 
sought by the agency can never exceed and is generally less than the 
harm caused by any such practice; and, b) the probability of detection 
and sanction is never bigger than one.  Due to these two facts,  the 
expected sanction facing a firm subject only to FTC enforcement (equal 
to the probability of detection and sanction multiplied by the sanction) is 
always less than the actual harm caused by the practice.  As firms 
internalize only the expected sanction, they internalize too little of the 
harm that their false and deceptive practices may cause.  Moreover, the 
longer it takes the FTC to detect and get a cease and desist order against 
a firm, the larger is the harm done by the false or deceptive practice (and 
the greater the gain to the firm from engaging in the practice).   Still, 
even if the FTC recovered back all the profits earned from every firm 
against which it enforced, the less-than-one probability of detection and 
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enforcement means that the expected sanction is too low to optimally 
deter false and deceptive practices.   In many instances, potential FTC 
sanctions are supplemented by adverse reputational effects so that the 
inadequacy of FTC sanctions alone is corrected.  Obviously, reputational 
effects can combine with FTC sanctions to move closer to optional 
deterrence only when the potential wrongdoer has a reputation worth 
protecting. 
 The problem of the inadequacy of FTC sanctions alone is likely 
to be most severe for firms that are smaller and operate on limited 
geographic markets (or, more generally, smaller markets) and which 
therefore are less likely to be on the FTC’s enforcement radar screen.   If 
the point of state CPA laws is to offset the inadequacy of FTC sanctions 
alone, then state CPA enforcement should be targeted against these and 
other any other identifiable category of firms that are unlikely to be 
enforced against by the FTC. 
 The dual public-private enforcement of state CPAs creates 
substantial challenges for CPAs to accurately or adequately address the 
inadequacy of FTC sanctions.  There is no reason to think that either 
state attorneys general or private class action attorneys will have an 
incentive to restrict their enforcement activity to firms and/or practices 
that would escape FTC enforcement.  In recent years, state AGs have 
been criticized for their aggressive pursuit of high profile cases against 
large multi-national companies – including numerous actions joined by 
dozens of AGs.180  These are precisely the companies that are likely to 
be adequately policed by the FTC.  AGs can easily justify the pursuit of 
such extraterritorial actions as an out-of-state revenue source for the 
AG’s state treasury – but that justification does not mean that the AGs’ 
actions enhances either consumer or taxpayer welfare.  Our analysis of 
private actions carries over to unwarranted actions by AGs (that is, 
actions that do not satisfy a consumer welfare standard and infringe on 
the FTC’s turf) and suggests that such AG prosecutions do cost in-state 
consumers in the form of higher prices – an invisible tax imposed by the 
AG.   Of course, faithful agent AG may buck the political incentives and 
not bring actions solely on revenue-generating or headline-generating 
capacity.  The consumer welfare standard provides a guide to which 
consumer protection actions are properly pursued by AGs. 
 
180 See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Government by Indictment: Attorneys General and 
Their False Federalism, AEI Working Paper #110 (May 24, 2005) available at 
http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.22565/pub_detail.asp. 
  62
                                                
 The incentive of class action attorneys filing actions under CPAs 
is in general to bring actions against those firms and practices that they 
believe will settle quickly and on relatively generous terms. As argued 
earlier, ideal targets for private lawsuits may include a mix of both small, 
risk averse firm and large publicly traded corporations subject to 
potential stock market impacts.  While some small firms may indeed be 
likely to escape FTC enforcement – and therefore ought on economic 
grounds to be targeted by state CPA enforcement – private class action 
attorneys may have an even stronger incentive to pursue large 
multinational companies that are especially likely be under more or less 
continuous scrutiny by the FTC.  Unlike the faithful agent FTC, 
moreover, private class action attorneys have every incentive to persuade 
courts to expansively interpret the substantive “false” or “deceptive” 
liability standard to encompass selling practices which the FTC would 
not find to be violative of its own cost-benefit understanding of that 
standard.  Hence, as currently configured, state CPA liability certainly 
supplements FTC enforcement, but it goes far beyond what would be 
justified on optimal deterrence grounds. 
 It may be argued that it is much too sanguine to assume that the 
FTC is a faithful agent.  Instead, it may be said, the FTC is subject to a 
variety of political influences that lead it to selectively enforce the FTC 
Act, shying away from politically costly enforcement actions and 
choosing instead to bring only those enforcement actions that promise 
political benefits or at least risk minimal political costs.   The general 
model of agency behavior presumed by this argument – that much 
agency behavior can be explained by the desire of regulatory agencies to 
maximize their perceived net political benefits – is we believe in general 
a quite accurate explanation of agency decision-making.181 But to our 
knowledge, there is no evidence that the interests of the FTC in 
maximizing its perceived political net benefits has caused it to deviate 
from its stated mission by under-enforcing against false and deceptive 
practices.  Instead, supporters of state CPA liability trumpet FTC 
enforcement practices as a model.182  This leads us to surmise that if 
 
181 As evidenced by Wesley A. Magat et al, Rules in the Making: A Statistical 
Analysis of Regulatory Agency Behavior (1986). 
182 See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Deception, Economic Loss and Mass-Market 
Customers: Consumer Protection Statutes as Persuasive Authority in the Common Law 
of Fraud, 48 Ariz. L. Rev. 829, 851 (2006)(“Concerning its deception power, the FTC 
has issued a particularly lucid, and conservative, statement of principles about why it 
will act.”) 
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anything, the FTC may be a bit too zealous at times, especially in its 
scrutiny of the largest and most visible firms.   If this is so, then this 
further supports the argument that state CPA’s may be used much too 
frequently against such firms.  
 
3.  National Markets and Federalism Concerns 
 
State CPAs present a patchwork quilt of consumer protection 
laws to larger consumer products and services companies with national 
markets.  Although state CPAs use similar terms and rely on private 
enforcement, there can be dramatic differences across states in terms of 
the definition of crucial terms and enforcement.   The only commonality 
appears to be that every state but one allows a private right of action 
under their CPA. Everything else—from whether the plaintiff needs to 
show reliance or actual injuries to the available remedies and everything 
in between—differs from one state to the next. 
The differences between these statutes make large consumer 
protection class action cases ripe for forum shopping183 which can have a 
negative effect on the defendant. But the diversity of consumer 
protection approaches can also make multi-state class action lawsuits a 
bad deal for consumers. Additionally, the oft-cited criticism of class 
actions—that the relief provided to the unnamed class members is 
usually pitiful—is even clearer in the context of a large consumer 
protection class action.184 
 
183 Although Congress has attempted to curb class action forum shopping with the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, it looks as though their effort will have little 
beneficial effect on consumer protection cases (from the business owner’s point of 
view).  CAFA only allows the defendant to remove the case to a federal court thus 
avoiding prejudicial procedural rules and prejudiced juries and judges, but the state’s 
substantive laws are still applicable. See, Amelia L. Sweeny and Rudy A. Englund, The 
Class Action Fairness Act’s Impact on Consumer Protection, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 233 
(2005). 
184 A recent and typical multi-state consumer protection class action illustrates this 
point.  In April of 2006, owners of Teflon-coated pots and pans brought a suit against 
Dupont alleging that the company concealed information from the government that 
indicated that Teflon-coated cooking utensils released harmful toxins when heated past 
a certain temperature.  David Pitt, Class-Action Status Sought in Teflon Suit, 
Washington Post, April 20, 2006.  The plaintiffs sought to certify a class that included 
potentially millions of Teflon-coated pan owners in a $5 billion dollar suit.  The sheer 
logistics of identifying, locating and contacting every owner of a non-stick pan in a 
single state would be impractical and, moreover, locating them in several states would 
be prohibitively expensive.  While there are other legally acceptable forms of notice, 
they are not anywhere near as effective.  See generally, Todd B. Hilsee, Shannon R. 
Wheatman, Ph.D., and Gina M. Intrepido, Do You Really Want Me To Know My 
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 State CPAs raise the same type of federalism challenges faced by 
many other areas of regulation in a federal system.  State tort law, and its 
interaction with federal health and safety regulations, has been a 
particularly vexing problem in recent years.185  Our civil justice system 
benefits from diffused economic and political power, but it is surely 
comes with its costs.  The static inefficiency caused by CPAs must be 
balanced against the dynamic benefits of jurisdictional variety and the 
“laboratory” of the states.   A challenge is to design institutions that 
maximize the net value of federalism in the face of pressure for 
centralized control.  Although it is tempting to advocate federal 
domination of consumer protection because of the inefficiencies of the 
current system of CPAs, such centralization must be evaluated in terms 
of the reality that federal enforcement of consumer protection has gone 
through some rough times of its own.186  Moreover, our analysis in the 
preceding subsection suggestions an economically sensible demarcation 
of federal and state consumer protection enforcement actions that allows 
for capturing the strength of both systems of enforcement – state CPA 
enforcement should be targeted against identifiable categories of firms 
that are unlikely to be effectively monitored by the FTC. 
 
IV.  POLICY IMPLICATIONS: REMOVE REDUNDANT 
“SOLUTIONS” 
 
 State CPAs are intended to complement the consumer protection 
policy of the FTC, and the FTC is intended to complement the consumer 
protection attributes of markets and the common law.  Former FTC 
Chairman Timothy Muris has characterized the institutions of consumer 
protection policy – markets, common law, and regulation – as a three-
legged stool.  Muris cautions about the need to keep the leg of the stool 
balanced.  Our analysis suggests that private actions under state CPAs 
have unbalancing negative consequences for all three legs of the 
consumer protection stool:  Markets are distorted by the perverse 
incentives to either disclose too much or too little information, while 
news of extortionate settlement sends inaccurate signals to consumers.  
The common law has been distorted to the point that private CPA 
litigation is stacked in favor of plaintiffs as CPAs have been interpreted 
 
Rights, 18 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1359 (2005). 
185  See Michael S. Greve and Richard A. Epstein, Federal Preemption: States’ 
Powers, National Interests (2007).  
186  The FTC as National Nanny, Wash. Post, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22. 
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by courts to limit the common law protections that reflected a balance of 
seller and consumer interests.  And, regulation at the state level is 
managed by a decentralized and uncoordinated decision making by 
private plaintiffs attorneys who are not in any manner constrained by the 
traditional public interest requirements of government regulation.187  
Clearly, consumer protection policy is knocked out of balance by the 
current regime of state CPAs. 
CPAs were designed to solve two simple economic problems: 1) 
individual consumers often do not have the incentive or means to pursue 
individual claims against mass marketers who engage in unfair and 
deceptive practices; and, 2) because of the difficulty of establishing 
elements of either common law fraud or breach of promise, those actions 
alone are too weak an instrument to deter seller fraud and deception.  
The most striking lesson of our analysis is that the typical state CPA – 
with relaxed rules for establishing liability, statutory damages, damage 
multipliers, attorneys fees and costs, and class actions – solves the basic 
economic problem that CPAs were intended to address several times 
over.  The effect of this redundancy in solutions is that CPAs can deter 
the provision of valuable information to consumers and, thus, harm 
consumers.  That is, as currently applied, state CPAs harm consumers.  
This need not be the case.   
The primary culprit in our analysis is the private cause of action 
under state CPAs.  Our analysis suggests that consumer welfare would 
be enhanced if states did away with the private action.  We are mindful 
of the argument that private actions are necessary because state 
governments do not have the resources to adequately enforce state CPAs.  
We find this argument woefully lacking.  First, it begs the question of 
why states are not willing to devote the resources to adequate consumer 
protection.  “Protecting consumers” would seem to be a proper and 
popular service for a government to provide its citizens.  Indeed, it would 
seem to be a government role that should be closely monitored by the 
chief law enforcement officer of the state – the Attorney General.  
Second, although private actions do not cost the state budget, our 
analysis indicates that private actions tax consumers in the form of 
higher prices – in effect, an excise tax to pay for “protection” that we 
argue is actually harmful to consumers.  Such a tax (if it could be 
 
187  For general comments on the development of such regulation through 
litigation, see W. Kip Viscusi, Regulation Through Litigation (2002) and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulation_through_litigation. 
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indentified to consumers for what it is) is particularly offensive to many 
consumers, policy analysts, and politicians because it is regressive.  
Since consumers are already forced to pay for the private enforcement of 
the state CPAs, it would be much more straightforward and transparent 
to dispense with the private actions and then let the taxpayers decide 
whether they are willing to pay for increased public enforcement with 
higher taxes. 
Our proposal to do away with private enforcement is unlikely to 
generate significant political attraction.  No doubt, many consumer 
protection groups would view it as an assault on consumer welfare.  On 
the other hand, a crusading attorney general could make the argument 
that consumer protection is too important to be left to disorganized 
litigation.  Regardless, we believe that a few more modest and politically 
palatable reforms would dramatically improve the impact of CPAs on 
consumer welfare. 
 
A.   Different Rules for Class Actions versus Individual Actions 
 
 Our analysis clearly demonstrates that the consumer class action 
by itself solves one of the fundamental economic problems that CPAs 
were intended to correct: the economic infeasibility of private lawsuits 
where the individual consumer suffers only small harm from seller 
deception but aggregate consumer harm is large  Once a putative class 
has been formed, all the other provisions of CPAs are unnecessary and, 
indeed, potentially harmful to consumers.  This suggests that courts and 
legislatures should have one set of rules for individual consumer actions 
and another set of rules for consumer class actions under CPAs.  
Specifically, the traditional common law protections of requiring 
reasonable reliance, causation, and injury should be restored to consumer 
class actions.  Statutory damages, damage multipliers, and punitive 
damages are not necessary for consumer class actions to solve the basic 
economic problem addressed by CPAs.   
 
B.   Class Actions Should Meet a Consumer Welfare Standard 
 
 The private attorney general rhetoric about attorney fee 
provisions of CPAs suggests that private attorneys should be held to a 
standard that assures that their actions are, in fact, in the public 
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interest.188  This point is relevant to both individual consumer actions 
and consumer class actions.  For example, even a relatively 
inconsequential individual action under a CPA can send important 
signals to mass marketers that may result in behavior that does not 
benefit all consumers.  A requirement that all actions under CPAs serve 
the public interest can be implemented through a consumer welfare 
standard. 
An important and significant means to rationalize consumer class 
actions would be for state legislatures or state courts to require that 
consumer class action attorneys allege as part of the class certification 
process that certification of the class and recovery by the class would in 
fact promote consumer welfare.  The court could hold pre-trial hearings 
on the consumer welfare standard and whether success by the class 
attorney is reasonably likely to help consumers, in general.   This would 
be a particularly important safeguard because the certification of a large 
class action often forces defendants to settle even when they believe that 
they would likely prevail at trial. 
At a common sense level, it seems obvious that CPAs should be 
interpreted to promote consumer welfare.  The FTC’s consumer 
protection mandate is now interpreted to be the promotion of consumer 
welfare.  In some states, the CPAs explicitly instruct judges to consider 
and give weight to FTC precedent.189  In fact, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho and 
Tennessee, among others, require direct consistency with federal 
precedent.190  And even without explicit mandate, many state courts will 
often defer to FTC precedent in construing the language of their CPA 
statutes.191  Finally, some CPAs create private rights of action against 
violations of the separate antitrust laws in that state (sometimes referred 
to as “mini-Sherman” or “mini-Clayton” Acts), which can allow more 
direct adherence to the standard of promoting consumer welfare by 
prohibiting anti-competitive practices.192 However, numerous judicial 
interpretations have opened the door to actions that may harm consumer 
 
188 See Martin H. Redish, Private Contingent Fee Lawyers and Public Power: 
Constitutional and Political Implications, paper presented at Searle Center Research 
Roundtable on Expansion of Liability under Public Nuisance, April 8-9, 2008, available 
at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Redish_revised.pdf. 
189 See Bauer, supra note  , at 148, Table 1. 
190 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 501.202 (West 2002); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 480-3 (1985); 
Idaho Code Ann. § 48-618 (2003); Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-115 (2001). 
191 Bauer, supra note  , at 146-47. 
192 See Practising Law Institute, Procedural Aspects Of Private Antitrust Litigation, 
1526 PLI/Corp 631, 654 (2006). 
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welfare.  The so-called “no loss” cases provide a perfect example of the 
type of action that would not be allowed under a consumer welfare 
standard.  If a loss is so remote or so difficult to prove, perhaps it should 
not be actionable. 
The current state of judicial interpretations may be a classic 
example of the law of unintended consequences.  The judges may simply 
be carrying out what they perceive as the legislative intent.  However, 
the multifaceted penalties in CPAs suggest that a better approach would 
be for the judges to be constrained by requiring the plaintiffs to make a 
credible story of how the action would promote the consumer welfare – 
beyond simply alleging that it is a violation of the public policy as 
reflected in the relevant CPA.193 
 
C.  State Court Reliance on FTC Interpretations of Unfair and 
Deceptive Practices 
 
 The FTC’s expertise in consumer protection far exceeds what can 
be expected of state courts.  As discussed above, the FTC’s definitions of 
unfair and deceptive practices reflect a consumer welfare standard and 
the balancing of costs and benefits of intervention that is simply not a 
part of the typical consumer action – individual or class – under state 
CPAs.  It is logical and reasonable for state courts to rely on the 
expertise and experience of the FTC in consumer protection matters.  
First, the FTC actually played an active role in encouraging the adoption 
of the “Little FTC Acts.”  The FTC helped create this leviathan, so 
perhaps it should help solve the problem.  Second, state courts initially 
deferred to FTC interpretations,194 but recent applications under CPAs 
have strayed far from that original relationship.  Indeed, it is clear that 
 
193 If actual damages are greater than statutory damages, then the presumption 
should be that the concerns about a case not being worth bringing have been satisfied.  
The expected recovery and the incentive to sue have been sufficiently increased by the 
CPA to solve the access to the courts issue, and certainly to provide increased 
deterrence, and thus judges should not further expand access to the courts through 
liberal interpretations of other aspects of the case – such as intent and reliance.  That is, 
if the deterrence has been increased by the statute, there is no need for judges to add to 
the statutory incentive structure. 
194 See, e.g., Bauer, p. 20 (“Even when a Little FTC Act makes no specific 
reference to the federal  FTC Act itself, state courts will frequently look to federal law 
because of the similarity to the state language, and because the FTC Act is a “rational 
source of authority” to the broad Little FTC Acts.”)(citing Marshall A. Leaffer and 
Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: 
The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 
521, 534 (1979-1980). 
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many actions under CPAs would not be entertained by the FTC.  Third, 
the FTC has developed a great deal of expertise in consumer protection 
and brings thousands of consumer protection complaints every year.  If a 
complaint would not be pursued by the FTC, then a similar complaint 
should not move forward in state court.  Fourth, in general, neither state 
agencies nor state courts have developed the expertise to analyze 
consumer protection issues.   
For all of these reasons, state legislatures and state courts should 
require the application of the FTC’s definitions of unfair and deceptive 
practices in all cases alleging the existence of such practices.  The 
currently ad hoc and highly uncertain state court interpretations of what 
constitutes “unfair” or “deceptive” seller communications almost surely 
deter some valuable and informative seller speech.  Either by state 
legislation or judicial interpretation, a safe harbor from state CPA 
liability should be created for seller statements that comply with the  
FTC’s considered regulatory definitions of “unfair” and “deceptive” 
practices.   
 
D.  Proactive FTC Intervention in Consumer Class Actions Filed 
Under State CPAs 
 
 The FTC consumer protection function logically extends to 
attempting to influence private litigation that threatens to harm consumer 
welfare.  A proactive role by the FTC would be for the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection to file amicus briefs with its staff’s analysis of the 
likely impact of the case on consumer welfare.  Another approach would 
be for the FTC, possibility at the suggestion of the judge hearing the 
case,195 to file a simple statement that similar practices have been 
investigated by the FTC and deemed to not contradict the FTC standards 
for unfair and deceptive.   
 
E.  In Class Action CPA Litigation, Punitive Damages Should be a 
Rare Exception, Awarded Only When there is a Low Probability of 
Detection and Liability 
 
The availability of the class action procedural device overcomes 
the problem of inadequate individual incentives to seek relief for false or 
 
195 Judges may request the FTC’s advice on the economics of various practices.  
The FTC staff routinely response to FTC requests. 
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deceptive seller practices and also provides very strong incentives for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to discover and then pursue claims against sellers 
who have engaged in false or deceptive practices.   The attorneys fee 
incentive in pursuing class litigation gives plaintiffs’ attorney a very 
strong incentive to monitor and investigate seller communications. For 
this reason, the class action device itself increases the probability that 
false and deceptive seller practices are detected and trigger liability.  
While the probability of detection and liability may rarely be equal to 
one, in class action CPA litigation, it will generally be sufficiently high 
that punitive damages are not necessary for optimal deterrence.  When 
punitive damages are awarded, the multiplier should rarely exceed one. 
 
F.  Regulatory Compliance Defense  
 
 When a business has complied with state regulatory mandates, 
compliance with such standards should be an absolute defense to private 
CPA actions under that state’s law.  Yale Law Professor Alan Schwartz 
has argued that such compliance should exculpate compliant firms as a 
matter of law.196  The “regulatory compliance defense” – which is also 
called the “regulatory standards defense”197 – would allow 
manufacturers and service providers a reasonable degree of certainty in 
acts and practices.  One implication of the regulatory compliance defense 
is that courts court put a quick end to cases such as Avery v. State Farm 
Mutual Insurance Company where State Farm was hit with a billion 
dollar punitive damages judgment for using generic replacement parts 
when the state insurance regulations encouraged them to use such parts 
to save money for policy holders.198  Moreover, it seems totally 
reasonable to insulate businesses from punitive damages awards when 
they comply with relevant regulations. 
Adoption of these modest proposals would be major steps toward 
reducing the corrosive effect of private actions under state CPAs.  Many 
of these steps are consistent with what Victor Schwartz and Cary 
 
196 Alan Schwartz, Statutory interpretation, capture, and tort law: the regulatory 
compliance defense Schwartz, 2 Am Law Econ Rev. 1-57 (2000).   
197 See, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz and Cary Silverman, Punitive Damages and 
Compliance with Regulatory Standards: Should a Manufacturer or Service Provider Be 
Punished When It Follows the Law?  Washington Legal Foundation, Legal 
Backgrounder, Vol. 12, Number 1 (September 2005) 
198 See note   supra. 
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Silverman call “common sense interpretation” of the statutes.199 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
Just as unintended consequences resulted from the states’ desires 
to empower consumers, any reform of state CPAs will equally need to be 
cognizant of reaching beyond the policy objectives of restoring balance 
to this area of the law.  The framework developed  in this article 
demonstrates that a relatively simple and straightforward set of policy 
reforms can make state CPAs a valuable tool for deterring socially 
harmful false and misleading seller practices while preventing the threat 
of massive CPA liability from chilling the communication of socially 
valuable product information.  These reforms recognize the deterrent 
power of class actions lawsuits, but discipline such suits by looking to 
federal regulatory standards for the substantive regulatory standard and 
by eschewing procedural devices (such as attorney’s fees and damage 
multipliers) that the class action makes unnecessary.   Properly reformed 
state CPA’s can advance the interests of both consumers and sellers in 




199  See note 9, supra. 
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APPENDIX. THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER 
STATE CPAs 
 
We are interested in how three crucial procedural institutions – 
the class action, attorneys fees and damage multipliers – interact to 
determine both the incentive for a plaintiff and plantiff’s attorney to file 
suit, and also the expected sanction. Our basic point is this: to overcome 
the lack of plaintiff incentives to sue under the common law, CPAs 
adopted attorney’s fee shifting provisions and damage multipliers.  But 
especially when put together with the class action, these innovations 
have created a very strong incentive for plaintiff attorneys to bring 
lawsuits.  CPAs have generated such high expected damages faced by 
defendants that unless CPA liability arises only when defendants 
engaged in clearly egregiously careless product design or marketing 
choices, CPAs will cause defendants to refrain from marketing socially 
desirable products and from advertising as fully as they should those 
products that they do market.   
 
1. Clarifying the Economic Rationale for Attorney Fee Shifting 
and Damage Multipliers: The Defendant’s Incentives  
 
We begin with the defendant’s incentives.  These are a function 
of: the sanction that the defendant expects to pay in the event that it is 
sued, which we call D; the cost to the defendant of taking actions that 
lower its risk of having to pay the sanction, which we denote by x (equal 
also to the level of precautions with normalized per unit cost of 1)  and 
three probabilities: that harm occurs, which we denote by h; that it is 
sued given that harm occurs, which we denote by s; and the probability 
that it has to pay the sanction D if sued, which we denote by q.  Consider 
a simple case where the defendant is risk neutral, and either takes the 
action and reduces its probability of harm and suit to zero, or does not 
take the action.  In this case, the defendant’s choice is:  
min {hsqD, x}.        (1) 
Now if the social goal is to have the defendant take the costly 
action if and only if the expected harm thereby averted is greater than the 
cost x, then what we would like the defendant to choose is: 
min {hH, x},        (2) 
where H is the actual magnitude of harm. Comparing (1) and (2), we can 
see that whenever the probability of suit and probability of being 
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sanctioned when sued are less than one, or when damages are set equal 
to the actual harm (D = H) then the defendant perceives too low a benefit 
from taking the costly, harm-averting action.  Under these assumptions, 
hH > hsqH.    
But suppose that we set damages not equal to actual harm, but at 
whatever level is necessary to equate the defendant’s expected benefit 
from the costly action – eliminating expected liability in the amount 
hsqD – to the expected social benefit from the costly action – eliminating 
the expected social harm hH.  Equating these two means setting: 
hsqD = hH, or simplifying and solving for D, we have that: 
D = H/sq.       (3) 
Equation (3) gives the basic economic rationale for punitive 
damages.200  Whenever the probability of suit and sanction are less than 
one, a rational, cost minimizing defendant will have too weak an 
incentive to take costly harm-averting action.  To equate the social and 
private benefit of taking care, the optimal sanction must be multiplied up 
by a multiplier that equals the inverse of the probability of suit times the 
probability of liability.   For example, if the probability of suit is .5, then 
even  if the probability of paying damages D when sued is very high, say 
.9, damages must be set equal to H/(.9)(.5) or roughly 2.2 times H in 
order to restore optimal incentives.  
Of course, by the same token, if damages are set too high relative 
to the probability of suit and liability, then a potential defendant will 
behave as if the social harm from her activity is much greater than it 
actually is.  If, for example, we presume as just before that the optimal 
multiplier is 2.2, but punitive damages are set equal to, say, 9 times 
 
200 See A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An 
Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869 (1998).  Amicus briefs based on this 
economic model of deterrence have been filed by each side in both of the most recent 
Supreme Court cases on punitive damages – State Farm v. Campbell and Philip Morris 
v. Williams.  See Brief of Amici Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, and 
the Citizens for a Sound Economy Foundation in support of Petitioner, State Farm Mut. 
Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003) (No. 01-1289); Brief of Keith 
N. Hlyton as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, State Farm, 123 S.Ct. 1513 
(2003) (No. 01-1289); Brief of Amici Curiae of A. Mitchell Polinsky, Steven Shavell, 
and the Cato Institute in Support of Petitioner, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 
S.Ct. 1057 (2007) (No. 05-1256); Brief of Amici Curiae of Professors Keith N. Hylton 
et al. in Support of Respondents, Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S.Ct. 1057 (2007) 
(No. 05-1256).  A recent application of this model to punitive damages is Judge 




actual harm, then the defendant will invest far more to lower the 
probability of liability than is socially optimal to reduce just the 
probability of harm.  
There is, however, an important qualification to equation (3), one 
that in fact explains why American law generally awards punitive 
damages against a defendant only if the plaintiff can show a very high 
degree of defendant fault.  Equation (3) essentially assumes that q, the 
probability of sanction given suit, is less than one only because 
sometimes careless or faulty defendants somehow escape liability.  But 
this is of course only part of the story.  A defendant’s behavior may be 
reasonably careful, and yet the defendant may face a positive risk of 
liability q even when it in fact did nothing wrong.  If the law routinely 
awarded punitive damages according to the formula in (3), then punitive 
damages would be higher, the lower is the probability that the defendant 
will be found liable for such damages.  Assuming that the legal process 
is imperfect but nonetheless rational, a lower probability of liability for 
punitive damages means that the defendant’s behavior was less, rather 
than more, culpable.  Optimal incentives require that liability falls as 
culpability falls, not the opposite.  
 On the economic model of deterrence, it is indeed precisely 
because of the risk of such error that American law does not allow 
punitive damages to be assessed against a defendant unless the jury finds 
that the defendant was greatly at fault.  For if a defendant is found to 
have been “grossly negligent” or to have acted with “reckless disregard,” 
then ordinary liability (q above) is likely to have been extremely high, 
approaching 1, and we need have no fear that punitive liability is being 
incorrectly imposed.   Hence in the cases in which punitive liability is 
actually imposed – those with a very high probability q of ordinary 
liability – the formula in (3) simplifies to: 
D = H/s ≡ mH,       (4) 
where we define m ≡ 1/s.  Equation (4)  says that the optimal multiplier 
for punitive damages is equal to 1 divided by the probability of suit.  The 
minor transgressions that often provide the basis for suit under CPAs are 
inherently a lower probability of detection and suit, but the de minimus 
nature of the damages suggests that the imposition of punitive damages 
should always require an analysis of the defendant’s fault. 
 
2. The Plaintiff’s Side: Attorneys Fees, Damage Multipliers and 
the Plaintiff’s Incentive to Sue 
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The previous section assumed a particular probability of suit.  
But the plaintiff’s incentive to bring suit is determined by three things, 
which together give us the plaintiff’s expected payout from filing suit: 
the amount of money that the plaintiff expects to get, whether from a 
jury or by settlement, an amount we shall denote as above by  D > 0; the 
attorneys fees and other costs that the plaintiff must incur to get that 
payout, an amount that we shall denote by c > 0; and, finally, the 
probability (as perceived by the plaintiff) that she will in fact get the 
payout D, which we denote as above by q.   
As our focus is not on issues relating to risk and uncertainty, we 
shall assume that consumers are risk neutral with respect to the decision 
whether or not to bring suit.  We shall also assume away agency cost 
problems, and presume that the consumer controls the level of effort and 
hence cost of any lawsuit that she were to bring, so that costs are 
optimally chosen, given the probability of success in a particular type of 
claim and possible payout.201 This means that consumers value their 
risky right to bring suit by its expected value, net of the cost of suit.  
Assuming that plaintiffs are economically motivated and rational in a 
very basic sense – in that they will undertake suit only if they perceive 
that suit has a positive net expected value – an injured consumer will 
bring suit if and only if her expected payout is bigger than her expected 
cost.  Using the notation just defined, the consumer will bring suit if and 
only if:  
qD ≥ c, or, 
q ≥ c/D =qT.        (5) 
Inequality (5) defines a threshold probability of success in getting 
a payout from suing, qT, below which the plaintiff expects a negative net 
expected return from suing and therefore will not sue. From (5), we can 
see that this threshold probability qT is higher – and suit less likely to be 
in the plaintiff’s interest – the higher are the plaintiff’s costs c and the 
lower is the plaintiff’s expected payout D.  In the classic consumer 
deception case that CPAs were intended to address, any individual 
plaintiff suffers only very small, economic harm and therefore expects a 
 
201 As our focus in on types of claim, we presume that the probability of success 
and magnitude of payout is determined solely by the claim type, rather than by the 
effort level of the plaintiff’s attorney. In a more complete model, the effort level would 
be chosen optimally so as to solve the problem maxc [q(c)D(c)- c].  The threshold 
probability we discuss in the text is then to be understood as the constraint that the 
solution to this problem generate a non-negative return. 
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small payout D, so small that such a plaintiff would not find a lawsuit to 
be  worthwhile, even if c, her cost of suit, is small.  In addition, as we 
discussed earlier, the traditional common law tort elements together 
worked to create a relatively low probability that the plaintiff would 
prevail at trial and hence also (for reasons we shall come to 
momentarily) a small probability q that the plaintiff would get a payout 
either from settlement or a trial award.  With no one to bring suit, ex post 
legal sanctions have no deterrent effect, and we have precisely the 
underdeterrence problem that CPAs were designed to address.   
 With the help of Figure 1 below, we can make these points more 
precise, and pave the way for analysis of the procedural changes 
introduced by CPAs.  Figure 1 graphs a mass marketer’s perceived 
probability of liability: its probability of being sued for unfair trade 
practices and having to pay the amount D in damages.   This probability 
is given by g, and it is equal to the probability of being sued, which we 
will denote by s, multiplied by the probability of being found liable for 
damages in the amount D, which as above is given by q.  What we have 
just shown is that for q <qT, the probability of suit, s, and hence also the 
probability of liability (given by g = qs) is 0.  Figure 1depicts a simple 
case in which for q ≥ qT, we have g = q (suit is always brought once it is 
economically viable, and so the probability of having to pay D is simply 







The procedural innovations made by CPAs – attorneys fees and 
various damage enhancers – affect the incentives depicted in Figure 1 on 
both the cost side and payout side.  On the cost side, assuming that 
attorneys’ fees that are paid when the plaintiff is successful in getting a 
payout (either in the form of settlement or a trial award) and fully cover 
the  plaintiff’s costs, the attorney’s fee provisions of CPAs  lower the 
plaintiff’s expected cost of bringing a lawsuit from c to (1-q)c.   Punitive 
damages, with damages equal to a multiple m of compensatory damages 
  78
                                                
D, a common feature of CPAs,  would of course increase the plaintiff’s 
payout from D to m(m+1)D.  With these two changes, plaintiffs will now 
find suit worthwhile whenever:202  
 q > c / ((m+1)D + c) ≡ qTcpa.      (6) 
Comparing (5) and (6), we see that when a CPA allows for the 
recovery of attorneys fee and treble damages, the threshold success 
probability for which plaintiffs will file suit falls by a factor of 1/(m +1+ 
c/D) or – since the underdeterrence problem is most severe when c > D – 
by at least a factor of 1/(m+2).  (Recall that m > 1). As depicted by 
Figure 2, the procedural innovations of attorney fee shifting and treble 
damages greatly increase the range of claims that are individually 
rational for a plaintiff to bring.  
 
202 In the more complete model, with plaintiff effort affecting both the probability 
of success and the magnitude of the payout, the optimal effort level would change 
under a CPA.  And because the CPA both lowers the plaintiff’s expected cost and 
increases the plaintiff’s return, the plaintiff would generally choose a higher level of 
effort – that is, cost – under the CPA than under the common law.  However, for any 
level of cost, the plaintiff gets a higher expected return under the CPA, and so the 
threshold probability would move in a model with cost endogenous as it does in our 
text and Figures. 
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By looking back at inequality (6), we can see inherent limitations 
on the effect of attorney’s fees plus treble damages in a typical consumer 
action. The impact of these procedural innovations is limited by the 
relationship between the cost of suit and the actual damages D suffered 
by the plaintiff.  If the damages are very slight relative to the cost of suit, 
then the threshold probability for suit to be viable will remain high even 
under a CPA that awards attorneys fees and punitive damages.203  With 
very small individual damages, then even if successful plaintiffs get their 
attorney’s fees back and get treble damages, individual plaintiffs will 
have an incentive to bring suit only in cases that are virtually sure 
winners (that is, for q → 1).   Similarly, statutory damages of, say, 
$2,500 per claim, may not solve the incentive problem.   
 
203 To see this most clearly, consider the limiting case, when  D → 0.  In this case, 
as can be seen from inequality (2), the threshold probability even under treble damages 
remains very close to 1. 
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Thus, in our model, the procedural innovations of CPAs – 
attorneys fees, costs, and enhanced damages – by themselves fail to 
solve the economic problem of individual actions with small amounts at 
stake.  On the other hand, the substantive changes brought about by 
CPAs – e.g., relaxation of traditional common law requirements of 
reliance, causation and injury – greatly increase the likelihood of success 
by plaintiffs.  Arguably, this is precisely what CPAs were intended to 
accomplish – help solve the incentive problems of plaintiffs with 
relatively small claims.  However, as shown in the following section, 
these salutary effects in the individual consumer cases of CPAs’ 
procedural and substantive innovations have a perverse effect when 
combined with class actions.  Indeed, the logic of extending the 
procedural and substantive innovations that were intended to help 
individual consumers achieve redress to large classes is flawed. 
 
 3. Adding the Class Action to the CPA Equation 
 
 (a) Class Actions versus Individual Common Law Actions 
The class action procedural device allows the aggregation of 
small claims across the entire set of consumers who have purchased an 
allegedly deceptively marketed product.  Under the class action, what 
matters are not the incentives of an individual consumer to bring suit, but 
rather the incentives of the attorney for the class.   Under a CPA with 
class actions, the attorney’s payout differs from the individual plaintiff 
we have considered thus far in that the attorney gets a payout which is 
generally an increasing function of the payout to the entire class that she 
represents.  With n class identical class members, the class payout is 
given by nD, where D as before represents individual damages, of which 
we may assume that the attorney gets a judicially-determined share r.  
The attorney’s fee provision of CPAs also ensures that regardless of the 
size of the class or the class members’ individual damages, the attorney 
gets at least her actual fees incurred when she succeeds in obtaining a 
payout (whether by settlement or trial award).   Hence in the event of 
success, a CPA class action attorney’s payout is max {rnD, c}.  Hence a 
class action attorney’s expected payout is given by: 
max q [max(rnD,c)] – c.      (7) 
A quick look at (7) shows that if the most that a class action attorney 
could hope for in the event of success was to get back her fees, c, then 
she would have no incentive to pursue the action, no matter how likely, 
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because her expected payout would be less than or equal to zero.204  
In general, the attorney expects a payout that is a share of the 
class damages (that is, max {rnD,c} = rnD).  In this case, the attorney 
pursues the class action if and only if: 
qrnD – c > 0, or if 
q > c/rnD.        (8) 
 Comparing (8) to (5), we see the threshold probability of success 
at which a class action lawsuit is viable for an individual attorney is 
lower than the threshold probability for an individual common law 
plaintiff whenever it is true that: 
rnD  > D, or if 
r > 1/n.        (9)  
What inequality (9) says is that the larger the number of plaintiffs 
in the class (on behalf of each of whom, the attorney recovers an amount 
D), the lower is the attorney’s share of the payout sufficient to ensure 
that the class action will enhance the viability of suit relative to 
individual common law actions.   For a very large class (n large), even 
for a relatively low share of the payout, class action attorneys will find it 
worthwhile to file a large range of low probability of success lawsuits 
that an individual plaintiff would not file.    For example, even for a very 
small class action of only 10 plaintiffs, the attorney’s payout from filing 
will be higher than the individual plaintiffs’ whenever the attorney 
expects to get a share of the payout that is bigger than or equal to 10 
percent.   For a more typical large class of 10,000 plaintiffs, the 
attorney’s expected payout will be bigger than that of the individual class 
members whenever that attorney expects to get more than .0001 share of 
the class payout.   Hence for any reasonably large class action, the 
attorney’s expected payout will be higher than what the individual 
plaintiffs would have expected, and so significantly more lawsuits will 
be brought simply as a consequence of the class action procedural 
device. 
 
(b) Class Actions, CPAs and Overdeterrence 
 
204  The only exception to this would be an attorney who would otherwise be 
unemployed, for such an attorney would perceive an opportunity cost less than her 
hourly fees – that is, she would get an hourly-based amount c if successful but her 
actual cost of pursuing the action would only be some fraction of her actual hourly rate 
(if she were certain to be otherwise unemployed, it would equal only the unemployment 
compensation amount, if any).   Our exposition in the accompanying text is presumably 
the more general situation. 
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Under very general circumstances, the class action will make 
unnecessary the enhanced damage provisions of CPAs.  The reason is 
that when both procedural devices exist – that is, CPA class actions – the 
threshold probability of success for suits to be brought will be even 
lower than with CPAs or class actions alone.   Even more importantly, in 
terms of the deterrence effect, class actions and punitive damages are 
completely duplicative: they both essentially give the plaintiff’s attorney 
the right to enforce against the defendant a large multiple of any 
individual plaintiff’s damages.  Therefore punitive damage multiples that 
essentially assume that there is no class action will be higher than the 
level that is necessary to optimally deter defendant’s from socially 
harmful behavior.  
The CPA class action with punitive damages is one in which the 
class action attorney gets her fees plus a share of the class payout when 
she is successful in obtaining such a payout, while bearing her own fees 
(her opportunity cost of bringing a CPA suit) when unsuccessful.  Under 
such a regime, the threshold probability of suit becomes: 
.      (10)   
Comparing inequality (10) with inequalities (6) – (8), we can see how 
CPA class actions generate the lowest threshold success probability suits 
to be viable.  This threshold probability falls, the bigger is the punitive 
damage multiplier m. Were we to place the threshold qT’ in Figure 6[No 
Figure 6.  Figure 2?], it would lie quite far to the left of qTcpa. 
q > c
mrnD + c ≡ q
T '
What class actions CPAs with punitive damages do is to 
effectively give the plaintiff’s attorney the right to enforce the rights of 
mrn individual plaintiff (where, to recall, m is the punitive damage 
multiplier, n is the number of plaintiffs in the class, and r is the 
attorney’s share of the award.)  Especially for large class actions of say 
10,000 or more, even if the plaintiff attorney gets only 25 percent of the 
recovery (r = .25), the class action alone gives the attorney a very large 
expected recovery.  Multiplying this recovery by the punitive damage 
multiple m further enhances the attorney’s expected payout.  All of these 
devices together create such a large expected payout for attorneys that 
they have an incentive to sue even if the probability of receiving a 
recovery (which we denoted earlier by q) is low.   Because of this large 
expected payout, the combined effect of class action representation with 
attorneys fees and punitive damages – the CPA procedural package – is 
to drive the probability of suit (denoted as above by s) close to 1 even for 
suits with a low probability of success.  
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Now recall from our earlier discussion that on optimal deterrence 
grounds, the punitive damage multiplier m should equal 1/s.  If, as just 
argued, CPA class actions offer such a large reward to plaintiffs’ 
attorneys that s approaches 1, then it might seem that there should be no 
punitive damage multiplier: that is, s = 1 implies that m = 1.  But this is 
a bit too simple, because as we have just seen from (10), it is the 
interaction of m, the punitive damage multiplier; n, the size of the class, 
and r, the attorney’s share of the class recovery, that determines a 
plaintiff attorney’s expected reward, incentive to sue and hence s.  The 
general lesson from (10) is more complex but also more important: 
The larger is the size of the class in a CPA class action and the 
higher is attorney’s share of the class recovery, the higher the 
probability of suit, and the less need there is for damage enhancements 
(statutory damages, double or treble damages, or punitive damages) in 
class action CPAs.  
